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Ubi Remedium, Ibi Ius at the WTO
Joel P. Trachtman
Abstract
The WTO law of remedies for violation appears incoherent.  States that fail to 
comply with their obligations are subject to WTO-authorized retaliation.  First, this 
retaliation takes the inefficient form of blocked trade by the complaining state.  This 
remedy is unlikely to be useful to developing countries.  Second, the amount of trade 
blocked by the violation is often used as the measure of authorized retaliation.  This 
measure is not necessarily incentive compatible, as it is not necessarily linked to welfare.  
Thus, its use may result in inefficient breach, or inefficient compliance, with WTO law.  
Third, only states that engage in dispute resolution proceedings are authorized to retaliate, 
artificially reducing the possible incentives to comply.  Fourth, authorization to retaliate 
is granted only prospectively, and there are generally no formal remedies for damages 
accruing before adjudication and the passage of permitted time for compliance.  This also 
artificially reduces incentives to comply.  This paper analyzes the rationale for, and 
structure of, welfare-based remedies that could form the basis for cash compensation in 
WTO law.  
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The only universal consequence of a legally binding 
promise is that the law makes the promisor pay damages if 
the promised event does not come to pass.1
According to conventional wisdom, it is a waste of time 
and money for developing countries to invoke the WTO’s 
dispute settlement procedure against industrial countries.2
1. Introduction 
Developing countries that win a lawsuit at the WTO may find that the remedies 
available to them are ineffective or inadequate.3 The latin maxim ubi ius ibi remedium
(“where there is a right, there is a remedy”)4 is apposite in converse form:  without an 
effective remedy, developing countries are denied rights (ubi remedium ibi ius).  Today, 
1 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 236 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1963) 
(1881).  While Holmes’ comment must be understood in the context of a particular 
perspective within the common law system, and while it seems to be contradicted to 
some extent in some civil law systems and indeed, in the international legal system, it is 
important to draw attention to the question of the results of non-compliance in any legal 
system.  On efficient breach in the civil law system, see Aristides Hatzis, Civil Contract 
Law and Economic Reasoning:  An Unlikely Pair?, working paper dated February, 2005, 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=661661. 
2
   Robert E. Hudec, The Adequacy of WTO Dispute Settlement Remedies for Developing 
Country Complainants, in DEVELOPMENT, TRADE AND THE WTO:  A HANDBOOK 81, 81
(Bernard Hoekman et al., eds. 2002).  While Hudec concedes that this conventional 
wisdom has “a great deal of truth to it,” his paper is devoted to showing the complexity of 
the issues involved.  Id.  See also Marc L. Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Developing Countries 
and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization Dispute 
Settlement, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 719 (2003); Gregory Shaffer, How to Make the WTO 
Dispute Settlement System Work for Developing Countries:  Some Proactive Developing 
Country Strategies, ICTSD Resource Paper No. 5, March 2003, available at 
http://www.ictsd.org/pubs/ictsd_series/resource_papers/DSU_2003.pdf. 
3
   In the Bananas case, the WTO arbitrators stated that “Given the difficulties and the 
specific circumstances of this case which involves a developing country Member, it could 
be that Ecuador may find itself in a situation where it is not realistic or possible for it to 
implement the suspension authorized by the DSB for the full amount of the level of 
nullification and impairment estimated by us in all of the sectors and/or under all 
agreements mentioned above combined.”  Decision by the Arbitrators, EC—Regime for 
the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas—Recourse to Arbitration by the EC 
under Article 22.6 DSU, WT/DS27/ARB/ECU, March 24, 2000, para. 177.  
4
   Attributed to Lord Holt in Ashby v. White (1703) 2 Ld. Raym. 955.  This maxim, of 
course, begs the analytical question asked by this paper.  In fact, this paper, following 
modern legal realism, argues that the right is largely defined by the remedy.  
3nearly 40 years since developing countries first proposed monetary compensation for 
violations of GATT law,5 it seems appropriate to reconsider the utility and potential 
structure of monetary compensation.
Imagine a legal system where the remedy imposed for violation consisted largely 
of authorization of the aggrieved party to boycott certain products of the wrongdoer.  
This would be a legal system in which the legal rights of the poor could be violated with 
relative impunity, as their boycott would often not be as meaningful as that of the 
wealthy.  Several developing countries have argued that “[t]he economic cost of 
withdrawal of concessions in the goods sector would have a greater adverse impact on the 
complaining developing country Member than on the defaulting developed country 
Member and would only further deepen the imbalance in their trade relations already 
seriously injured by the nullification and impairment of benefits.”6 The recent example 
of Antigua’s claim against the U.S. in connection with cross-border gambling services is 
an example.7  Is there any producer in Antigua that would benefit from protection against 
U.S. goods or services?8
This would be a legal system in which there could be little assurance that the 
punishment would “fit” the crime in any meaningful terms, and so there would be little 
assurance that states would have appropriate (i.e., welfare maximizing) incentives to 
comply.  In a private law setting in which there might be circumstances where welfare 
maximization calls for violation, as in efficient breach of contract or efficient lack of 
precaution in tort, remedies that are not calibrated in welfare terms would have no 
necessary connection with welfare maximization.  
5
   For a description of the negotiations, see ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL 
SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY, 242-243 (2d ed. 1990).
6
   World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement Body, Special Session, Proposals on 
DSU by Cuba, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and 
Zimbabwe, TN/DS/W/19, 9 October 2002.  Bown uses a bargaining model of a trade 
dispute to show that when countries are large, a complainant’s ability to affect the terms 
of trade will greatly increase its ability to threaten retaliation. Thus, a tariff response by a 
large complainant can both increase the complainant’s welfare and decrease the 
respondant’s welfare, yielding twice the effect.  Chad P. Bown, The Economics of Trade 
Disputes, the GATT's Article XXIII, and the WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding,  
14 ECON. & POL. 283 (2002). 
7
   Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply 
of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS/285/AB/R, circulated April 7, 2005. 
8
   This is a different, and more appealing, argument than that of scale.  The scale 
argument—to the effect that small countries should have as much “say” and as much 
dispute settlement “clout” as large countries—is a corollary of sovereign equality.  As 
such, it suffers from the same defects, including its implicit preference of sovereign 
equality over individual equality.  
4Furthermore, the greatest effect of law comes not from formal litigation, but from 
compliance in the shadow of the law.9  Without appropriate remedies, states may not 
have appropriate incentives to comply.  With remedies that exert too great an influence, 
states may have incentives to comply where they should not.  After all, WTO law is not 
like the international law proscription of genocide or torture:  it does not normatively 
demand compliance at all costs.10  It seems attractive to allow states the flexibility to 
“buy” their way out of at least some kinds of obligations by providing compensation to 
other states.  Efficient breach is an attractive concept in at least some areas of trade law.11
This is more than a developing country problem.  To the extent that WTO
remedies are incoherent, the legal system is incoherent.  This paper seeks to advance 
discussion of reform of the structure of remedies in WTO law, with a focus on the 
concerns of developing countries.12 In a proposal made by 50 members of the Least 
9 See Marc Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Early 
Settlement in GATT/WTO Disputes, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 158 (2000); Robert 
Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of 
Divorce, 88 YALE L. J. 950 (1979).  
10
   There are those who would argue that the laws against torture should be subject to 
exception where the cost of compliance is too great.  [Dershowitz]
11
   We must recognize that efficient breach may be more attractive to U.S. lawyers than 
to lawyers from the civil law tradition.  See Aristides Hatzis, Civil Law and Economic 
Reasoning:  An Unlikely Pair, working paper dated February 6, 2005, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=661661.  
12
   This literature is now extensive.  It includes a number of proposals by states in 
connection with current WTO negotiations.  These are helpfully listed and summarized at
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/iiel/research/projects/dsureview/synopsis.html.  See in 
particular the Proposal by the African Group, TN/DS/W/15, September 25, 2002 
(proposing “monetary compensation to be continually paid pending and until the 
withdrawal of the measures in breach of WTO obligations”).  It also includes a number of 
proposals by commentators.  See, e.g., Kym Anderson, Peculiarities of Retaliation in 
WTO Dispute Settlement, 1World Trade Review 123 (2002); Claude Barfield, WTO 
Dispute Settlement System in Need of Change, 37 INTERECONOMICS 131 (2002); Marco 
Bronckers & Naboth van den Broek, Financial Compensation in the WTO:  Improving 
the Remedies of WTO Dispute Settlement, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 101 (2005); Chi 
Charmody, Remedies and Conformity under the WTO Agreement, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L.
307 (2002); Steve Charnovitz, Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 792 
(2001); Patricio Grané, Remedies under WTO Law, 4 J. INT’L ECON. L. 755 (2001); 
Bernard M. Hoekman & Petros C. Mavroidis, WTO Dispute Settlement, Transparency 
and Surveillance, in DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE WTO: A PRO-ACTIVE AGENDA 131 
(Bernard Hoekman & Will Martin eds., 2001); Robert L. Howse & Robert W. Staiger, 
United States—Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (Original Complaint by the European 
Communities)—Recourse to arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the 
DSU, WT/DS136/ARB, 24 February 2004:  A Legal and Economic Analysis, May 8, 
2005; John H. Jackson, Dispute Settlement and the WTO: Emerging Problems, in FROM 
GATT TO THE WTO: THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 
5Developed Country Group in 2002, these countries proposed “monetary compensation 
equal to the loss or injury suffered” commencing from the date of adoption of the illegal 
measure.  They also proposed that collective retaliation be made available in cases of
complaints by least developed countries.13 This paper articulates some of the rationales 
for these proposals.
Some have suggested an understanding of the WTO legal system that does not 
allow for states to breach and provide compensation for their breach:  a strong rule of 
pacta sunt servanda.14  Such a system is comparable to a legal system in which the only 
remedy for breach of contract is specific performance:  obligors have no option to breach.  
Under such a system, potential complainants wield an option to impose inefficiently 
costly performance on the potential respondent.  And in fact, the formal legal obligation 
under WTO law seems to be simply to comply:  to withdraw measures that violate WTO 
law, regardless of their efficiency.  However, we must distinguish between doctrine and 
practice, and between authority and power:  we must examine the law in action.  
Even if the WTO legal system is in theory and text a system of mandatory law, 
which is at least contestable, its mandatory nature does not extend to the power of its
67 (2000); Jason Kearns & Steve Charnovitz, Adjudicating Compliance in the WTO: A 
Review of DSU Article 21.5, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 331 (2002); Pieter Jan Kuyper, Remedies 
and Retaliation in the WTO: Are They Likely to be Effective? The State Perspective and 
the Company Perspective, 91 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 282 (1997); Kofi Oteng Kufuor, 
From the GATT to the WTO: The Developing Countries and the Reform of the 
Procedures for the Settlement of International Trade Disputes, 31 J. W ORLD TRADE 117 
(1997); Nikolaos Lavranos, Some Proposals for a Fundamental DSU Reform, 29 LEGAL 
ISSUES EUR. INTEGRATION 73 (2002); ROBERT Z. LAWRENCE, CRIMES & PUNISHMENTS? 
RETALIATION UNDER THE WTO  (2003); Robert M. MacLean, The Urgent Need to Reform 
the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Process, 8 INT’L TRADE L. REG. 137, (2002); Petros C. 
Mavroidis, Remedies in the WTO Legal System: Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 11 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 763 (2000); Victor Mosoti, In Our Own Image, Not Theirs: Damages as 
an Antidote to the Remedial Deficiencies in the WTO Dispute Settlement Process: A View 
from Sub-Saharan Africa, 19 B.U. INT’L L.J. 231 (2001); Joost Pauwelyn, Enforcement 
and Countermeasures in the WTO: Rules are Rules - Toward a More Collective 
Approach, 97 AM J. INT’L L. 335 (2001); Timothy M. Reif & M. Florestal, Revenge of 
the Push-me, Pull-you: The Implementation Process under the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding, 32 INT’L LAW. __ (1998); Arvind Subramanian & Jayashree Watal, Can 
TRIPS Serve as an Enforcement Mechanism for Developing Countries in the WTO?, 3 J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 403 (2000); Alan O. Sykes, The Remedy for Breach of Obligations under 
the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Damages or Specific Performance? in NEW 
DIRECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JOHN H. 
JACKSON 347 (Marco Bronckers & Reinhard Quick eds., 2000).
13
   Proposal by the LDC Group, TN/DS/W/17, October 9, 2002.  
14
   Under Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, “[e]very treaty in 
force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.”  
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.  
6formal remedies:  the “right” is undermined, or is less than may initially be thought, by 
virtue of the remedy.  Again, without a compelling remedy, there is no effective “right” 
to specific performance even if the obligation is simply to comply.  This is illustrated by 
the cases, such as Hormones, where WTO law, definitively declared, has not met 
compliance.  
Another alternative that has been recommended allows states to auction the right 
to boycott to the highest bidder.15  This alternative may solve the problem that the right to 
boycott as a remedy disenfranchises the poor, but it does not necessarily solve the 
problem of fit in welfare terms: of welfare maximization.  
A third alternative is to make the possibility of compensation for violations more 
plausible, by pre-negotiating “contingent liberalization commitments” that would be 
implemented by the breaching party in exchange for a breach.16 While this approach 
seems also to address the problem of asymmetry of power by providing the possibility of 
a real remedy for developing countries, it also does not address the problem of fit in 
welfare terms.  It has the important advantage of avoiding a welfare-reducing boycott.  
While many commentators and states have suggested the possibility of cash 
remedies, none have analyzed systematically the problem of calculation and 
implementation of cash remedies in the WTO legal system.  Bhagwati argues that cash 
compensation “would amount to only a small fraction of the value of trade affected if 
estimated (as it should be) as the gains from trade lost rather than the total value of lost 
trade.”17
This paper briefly describes the existing system of remedies in general 
international law in part 2.  In part 3, it describes the existing WTO treaty law and 
jurisprudence of remedies.  In part 4, it analyzes this system utilizing the law and 
economics analysis of contract remedies, examining the conditions for efficient breach.  
In part 5, it examines the possibility of developing a welfare-based remedy in the WTO 
legal system.  Part 6 evaluates the arguments for and against a system of cash remedies.  
Part 7 concludes.  
2. The Existing International Law System of Remedies
In connection with remedies, as in other areas, the WTO legal system is a part of 
the international legal system.  But this does not mean necessarily that the general 
15
   Proposal by Mexico, TN/DS/W/23 (November 4, 2002). See the evaluation of this 
concept by Kyle Bagwell, Petros C. Mavroidis, & Robert Staiger, The Case for 
Auctioning Countermeasures in the WTO, Working Paper dated August 2004, available 
at http://www.columbia.edu/~kwb8/auctionation080904.  
16
   Lawrence, supra note 12.  
17
   Jagdish Bhagwati, After Seattle:  Free Trade and the WTO, 77 INT’L AFF. 15, 28 
(2001).  Bhagwati continues to suggest that “compensation in turn could be directed to 
the industry whose market access has been lost. . . .”  
7international legal system forms part of the internal WTO legal system.  Rather, under 
international law, the WTO legal system is a treaty regime with special characteristics 
and rules.  One area of specialty is the system of remedies in WTO law.18  This system is 
simply different from the system of remedies found in general international law.  This 
section describes the WTO system of remedies within the general international legal 
context.  
a. A Taxonomy of Remedies in International Law
Remedies for violation of law or contract serve a number of functions in society.  
Remedies may be designed (i) to compel compliance, (ii) to promote compliance, (iii) to 
promote efficient compliance while avoiding inefficient compliance, and (iv) to punish 
transgressors separately from the effects on compliance.  
At general international law, formal legal remedies against states are rarely 
punitive.19   It is important to define “punitive” in our context.  In this paper, we will 
distinguish among four quantitative approaches to remedies:  (i) less than proportionate, 
(ii) proportionate, (iii) compelling, and (iv) punitive.  Proportionate remedies are those 
that are equivalent to some measure of damage.  Compelling remedies are those set at a 
level sufficient to compel compliance.  In theory, compelling remedies need not be 
greater than proportionate, but they are often used as a step up from proportionate 
remedies.  Punitive remedies go beyond proportionate, and beyond compelling, to add a 
measure of remedy that is designed to punish.  The reader will immediately perceive that 
it is not clear that any of these measures would necessarily result in efficiency.  This 
paper explores the conditions of efficiency.  
18 See Petros Mavroidis, Remedies in the WTO Legal System:  Between a Rock and a 
Hard Place, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 763 (2000).  
19
   See N. Jørgensen, A Reappraisal of Punitive Damages in International Law, 68 BRIT. 
Y.B. INT’L L. 247 (1997); S. Wittich, Awe of the Gods and Fear of the Priests: Punitive 
Damages in the Law of State Responsibility, 3AUSTRIAN REV. INT’L & EUR. L. 31 (1998).  
In the Rules on State Responsibility, for example, “the approach taken to 
countermeasures is an instrumental rather than a punitive one.  Countermeasures are 
measures taken not with a view to the punishment of the state which committed the 
internationally wrongful act, but with a view to ensuring that the state ceases the 
internationally wrongful act (if it is a continuing act) and provides reparation.  
Countermeasures are seen as instrumental to obtaining reparation in the broad sense.”  
James Crawford, The Relationship Between Sanctions and Countermeasures, a 
contribution to the Colloquium of the Graduate Institute of International Studies 
(Geneva) on United Nations Sanctions and International Law (June 1999), available at 
http://lcil.law.cam.ac.uk/ILCSR/Statresp.htm.  Punishment is separated from the 
permissible measures seeking reparation or cessation of violation.  See also Case 
concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, ICJ Reports 1997 p. 3 at 55 (para. 83).
8At general international law, as reflected in the Rules of State Responsibility,20
the requirement is cessation and reparation.  Reparation takes the forms of restitution, 
compensation, and satisfaction.  General international law fails to distinguish sharply 
between restitution and compensation as obligations,21 whereas law and economics 
theory does so.  In law and economics theory, there is an important distinction between 
property rights, which would require restitution, and liability rules, which merely require 
compensation.22  Art. 35 of the Rules of State Responsibility provides for restitution only 
where it is possible and does not impose a wholly disproportionate burden.  Depending 
on how the disproportionate burden criterion is applied, this approach may be understood 
as a hybridized property-liability rule. 
The remedies that may be applied for violation of international law23 may be 
described by the following table:
Material Requirement Temporal Application
Cessation End violation Prospective (ex nunc)
Restitution Restore status quo Retrospective (ex tunc)
Compensation Substitute for 
restitution/cessation
Retrospective/prospective
Countermeasures Sufficient to induce 
compliance
Prospective
Punishment Sufficient to punish Retrospective
There are two analytical components:  the measure of damages and the period of time for 
which that measure is calculated.  
b. Cessation, Lex Specialis, and Countermeasures
Under the Rules on State Responsibility, a primary obligation of a state that 
violates its international legal obligations is cessation of the violation.24  However, we 
20
 State Responsibility: Titles and Texts of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States 
for Internationally Wrongful Acts Adopted by the Drafting Committee on Second 
Reading, U.N. GAOR Int'l L. Comm'n, 53d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.602/Rev.1 (2001) 
[hereinafter Rules of State Responsibility]. For the ILC commentaries on the Rules of 
State Responsibility, see generally Text of the Draft Articles with Commentaries Thereto, 
in Report of the International Law Commission, Fifty-Third Session, U.N. GAOR, 56th 
Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 59-365, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter Commentaries].
21
 See, e.g., British Claims in the Spanish Zone of Morocco, UNRIAA, vol. II, p. 615 
(1925), Religious Property Expropriated by Portugal, ibid., vol. I, p. 7 (1920); Walter 
Fletcher Smith, id., vol. II, p. 913 (1927), at p. 918; Heirs of Lebas de Courmont, id., vol. 
XIII, p. 761 (1957), at p. 764. 
22 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability:  One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1090 (1972).
23
   We exclude from our analysis the potential remedy of “satisfaction,” as it is an 
exceptional and specialized form of reparation.    
9should note that obligations require compliance in accordance with their terms.  
Therefore, if a state has an obligation that is qualified by an alternative performance—
e.g., refrain from polluting or clean up the pollution—it cannot be said that there is a 
strict obligation to refrain from polluting.  Similarly, in the WTO context, a safeguards 
measure that complies with the conditions specified in Article XIX of GATT must be 
understood as authorization not to comply with the prohibitions for which it provides an 
exception.  Again, it cannot be said that there is a strict obligation to comply with the 
prohibitions that are relaxed by Article XIX of GATT.  
Similarly, it is possible for states to specify the remedy that will be available for 
violation.  States are permitted to create lesser or greater remedies than those available at 
general international law as described in the Rules on State Responsibility.  The Rules
reflect this in Article 55, which specifically authorizes lex specialis arrangements for 
responsibility.  The Commentary suggests that certain provisions of WTO law relating to 
remedies have the character of lex specialis.25
Interestingly, and in contrast to some of the arguments made regarding strict 
compliance with WTO law, the International Court of Justice “has generally not made 
orders for specific performance or for restitution in the absence of express provision for 
this in an agreement between the parties.”26
c. Restitution
As articulated in the Chorzów Factory case,27 restitution is the preferred remedy 
at general international law.  In the Rules, “restitution” is defined as re- establishing “the 
situation which existed before the wrongful act was committed . . . .”28  This may be 
achieved by returning territory or property.  In many contexts, restitution is impossible.  
In the trade context, restitution could apply in some areas.  For example, where an illegal 
subsidy is paid, it may be that a requirement of disgorgement may be understood as 
restitution.  On the other hand, even disgorgement may not place injured competitors 
back into the position that they would have enjoyed if the subsidy had never been paid.  
In many trade contexts, restitution will not be apposite, or will be highly impractical.  
Thus, our focus will be on cessation, compensation, and countermeasures.  
d. Compensation
Under the Rules on State Responsibility, compensation is a “second-best” form of 
reparation for violation of international law.  As the ICJ stated in the Chorzów Factory
case, ”[t]he impossibility, on which the Parties are agreed, of restoring the Chorzów 
24 Article 30.  
25
   Commentary at p. 357.  
26
   Christine Gray, Types of Remedies in ICJ Cases:  Lessons for the WTO, in IMPROVING 
WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES 401, 404 (Friedl Weiss, ed. 2000).
27
   Factory at Chorzów, Merits, 1928, P.C.I.J. Series A, No. 17, p. 48.
28
   Article 35.  
10
factory could therefore have no other effect but that of substituting payment of the value 
of the undertaking for restitution.”  As we discuss below, the calculation of the value of 
the asset taken, or of the performance denied, is complex.  In WTO law, “compensation” 
is understood to be a voluntary arrangement under Article 22.2 of the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding(DSU).  This is different from the meaning under the Rules, where 
compensation may be understood as the payment of damages—voluntary or not.  
e. Countermeasures:  Inducing Compliance
According to the structure of the Rules on State Responsibility, countermeasures 
are separate from remedies per se.  Countermeasures are unilateral measures by the 
injured state in response to failure of the injuring state to comply with its obligations to 
cease the violation and make reparations for the violation.29  However, countermeasures 
have a dual character:  they are generally designed to induce compliance, but they may 
also provide some compensation to the injured state.30
Under the Rules on State Responsibility, countermeasures are intended to induce 
compliance by the target state.  The Commentary to the Rules understands WTO law to 
exclude the general international law on countermeasures, by virtue of the DSU’s 
requirement for authorization of measures “in the nature of countermeasures.”31 Thus, by 
requiring authorization prior to the use of countermeasures, the WTO restricts the right of 
states that would otherwise exist at general international law.32
f. Punishment
International law does not sanction punitive action by states.  Article 49 of the 
Rules of State Responsibility requires countermeasures to be “proportionate,” which 
seems to exclude punitive countermeasures.  Under Article 47 of the Rules, the purpose 
of countermeasures is to induce compliance, and does not include punishment.  However, 
retaliation is fungible in a sense:  a measure that is intended to induce compliance may 
also be felt to punish.  
While punishment of states in many international law settings seems unappealing, 
there is a rationalist basis for disproportionately large countermeasures in certain 
29
  See generally E. ZOLLER, PEACETIME UNILATERAL REMEDIES: AN ANALYSIS OF 
COUNTERMEASURES (1984); O.Y. ELAGAB, THE LEGALITY OF NON-FORCIBLE COUNTER-
MEASURES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1988).     
30
   Countermeasures are distinguished from retorsion by virtue of the fact that 
countermeasures would be illegal if they were not taken in response to a prior wrongful 
act by the target state.  Article 49.  
31
   Commentary to Chapter II, para. 9, p. 328.  
32 See Warren F. Schwartz & Alan O. Sykes, The Economic Structure of Renegotiation 
and Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organization, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 179 (2002) 
(arguing that limitation on retaliation was the main purpose of the innovations in the 
DSU).  
11
contexts.  This basis is the probability of enforcement.  Where the probability of 
enforcement is 50%, there is a rationalist argument for doubling the damages in order to 
induce compliance.  Such doubling might be interpreted as punitive.
g. Reputation and “International Obligation”
Reputation in this context is best understood not as a formal remedy, but as a 
parameter that may be valued by states, and may be lost by non-compliance.33
Reputation, broadly understood, is the reason that there might be a right that has real 
effects without a formal remedy.  The best way to understand reputation is as an informal 
remedy, and it may easily be understood in rationalist terms.  
Indeed, we might understand reputation as an additional motivation by states to 
comply.  In this sense, reputation may add an important finger to the scale of compliance.  
Reputation may help to explain why we observe widespread compliance with WTO law 
despite existing prospective-only remedies that would seem, considered alone, to provide 
incentives for breach.34 Of course, states may not care about reputation per se, but are 
more likely to care about their ability to induce other states to make concessions in the 
future, and to comply with existing concessions. This role of reputation may be 
understood bilaterally, as similar to linkage politics in the political science literature,35 or 
as similar to multi-sector contact in the industrial organization literature.36 Alternatively, 
33 See Andrew Guzman, International Law: A Compliance Based Theory, 90 CAL. L. 
REV. 1823 (2002).
34
   For analyses of the role of reputation, sometimes referred to in this literature as 
“international obligation,” see Shannon K. Mitchell, GATT, Dispute Settlement and 
Cooperation:  A Note, 9 E CONOMICS AND POLITICS 87 (1997); Dan Kovenock & Marie 
Thursby, GATT, Dispute Settlement and Cooperation, 4 ECONOMICS AND POLITICS 151 
(1992).  While “international obligation” and “reputation” are not necessarily the same 
thing, for our purposes, it is acceptable to treat them as such.  
35 See ROBERT KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY 91 (1984); Ernst Haas, Why Collaborate? 
Issue Linkage and International Regimes 32 WORLD POLITICS 357 (1980); Michael D. 
McGinnis, Issue Linkage and the Evolution of International Cooperation, 30:1 J. CONFL. 
RES. 141 (1986); Robert E. Tollison & Andrew D. Willett, An Economic Theory of 
Mutually Advantageous Issue Linkage in International Negotiations, 33 INT’L ORG. 425 
(1979).  McGinnis shows formally that in a prisoner’s dilemma “multisupergame” 
players may adopt strategies that create linkages across time and games, providing 
opportunities for cooperation where cooperation would not be possible for isolated 
games.
36 See, e.g., D.B. Bernheim & M.D. Whinston, Multimarket Contact and Collusive 
Behavior, 21 RAND J. ECON. 115 (1990); Corwin Edwards, Conglomerate Bigness as a 
Source of Power, in “Business Concentration and Price Policy,” NBER Conference 
Report (Princeton University Press 1955); Hitoshi Matsushima, Multimarket Contact, 
Imperfect Monitoring and Implicit Collusion, 98 J. ECON. THEORY 158 (2001); Giancarlo 
Spagnolo, On Interdependent Supergames:  Multimarket Contact, Concavity and 
Collusion, 89 J. ECON. THEORY 127 (1999).
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to the extent that information and incentive problems may be overcome, it is possible that 
multilateral reputational effects could add a much larger finger to the scale of 
compliance.  
Under these circumstances, we might understand dispute settlement as providing 
a method for discriminating between defection and compliance, in order to provide 
information necessary for multilateral reputational sanctions to operate.  Milgrom, North 
and Weingast argue that third-party dispute settlement can assist in developing 
cooperation.  Maggi makes this point in the trade context.37 Third-party dispute 
settlement can solve the following information problem.  If two parties have a dispute, in 
which one accuses the other of defection, how can other members of the community 
determine whether the accusation is true?38
Reputation may be a powerful force in promoting compliance, and should be 
factored into any analysis of remedies.  As Kovenock and Thursby, and Mitchell, 
conclude, formal WTO remedies that seem inadequate to induce compliance on their own 
seem to be supplemented by reputation, or “international obligation,” in order to induce a 
high level of compliance.39 While their work does not distinguish sharply among (i) 
generalized multilateral retaliation and issue linkage, (ii) concern for general respect for 
international legal rules (which may be the same as (i)), and (iii) a preference for a good
reputation, each of these factors may be at work.  However, Bown finds “only limited 
evidence that the costs imposed by ‘international obligation’ are suff iciently large to” 
credibly affect behavior.40
Article 22.8 of the DSU, specifying that suspension of concessions is a temporary 
remedy, provides that the WTO Dispute Settlement Body shall continue to keep under 
surveillance the implementation of adopted recommendations or rulings.  This 
surveillance would help to effectuate the role of reputation.  
It may be that reputation has different effects in different types of cases.  Perhaps 
where the violation is clear or flagrant, reputation would have a stronger effect.  On the 
other hand, where the violation is a matter of interpretation, and there are appealing 
arguments on both sides, as in many circumstances where trade liberalization comes into 
conflict with other values, including domestic regulation, reputation may play a weaker 
role.  In the Hormones case, it is not clear whether the EC or the U.S. has paid a greater 
price in reputation.  
37
   Giovanni Maggi, The Role of Multilateral Institutions in International Trade 
Cooperation, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 190 (1999).
38
    Paul R. Milgrom, Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, The Role of Institutions 
in the Revival of Trade:  The Law Merchant, Private Judges and the Champagne Fairs, 2 
ECON. & POL. 1, 8 (1990).
39
   Note 34, supra.  
40
   Chad P. Bown, On the Economic Success of GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement, 86 REV. 
ECON & STATS 811(2004) .
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h. Public Interest Remedies and Public Choice Remedies
As we consider remedies in the international system, among states, as compared 
with remedies in the domestic system, among individuals and firms, we must recognize 
that states are imperfect mediators of individual preferences.41  Therefore, a remedy that 
appears on its face to be consistent with public interest—with welfare economics—may 
not yield efficient incentives in a world of states.  
And yet, public choice analysis recognizes that government operatives are often 
especially sensitive to the concerns of concentrated or well-organized interest groups.  
Therefore, it would not necessarily be inconsistent with public choice analysis to use a 
reference to profitability as a measure of damages.  Of course, it might be equally 
plausible to use references to jobs lost and gained as a measure of damages from a public 
choice perspective.  But there is no reason to assume that volumes of trade are the sole or 
even central governmental preference.  Public choice does not require mercantilism.42
Rather, the benefit that would be received by import competing domestic producers or by 
domestic exporters is dependent on the prices they would receive.  While in certain 
circumstances, trade volumes may be congruent with terms of trade,43 there can be no 
assurance that volumes of trade are linked with terms of trade effects, or welfare,44 in any 
particular case.45 This is especially true for small economies.
The normative goal of positive public choice analysis must be to enhance the 
alignment between the behavior of governmental operatives and public welfare.  So, there 
is no normative argument that remedies in WTO disputes should be designed to 
maximize the welfare of governmental operatives.  Rather, the normative goal is to 
suggest methods in which remedies could be redesigned in order to provide optimal 
incentives for welfare maximization.  Of course, without great knowledge of the 
problems of alignment between governmental operative welfare and public welfare, it is 
41
   Actually, firms, too, are imperfect mediators of individual interests, as shown by the 
study of corporate law over the past 50 years.  This raises the question, in connection 
with contracts entered into by firms and damages or penalties assessed against firms, 
whether a non-welfarist approach to damages would be desirable in order to respond to 
the representational defects of the firm.  
42
   Lawrence points out the mercantilist perspective behind this system.  Lawrence, supra
note 12, at  43.
43 KYLE BAGWELL & ROBERT W. STAIGER, THE ECONOMICS OF THE WORLD TRADING 
SYSTEM (2002).
44 See Howse & Staiger, supra note 12 (suggesting that the 1916 Act arbitrators’ 
interpretation would call for quantification of the welfare effect on the relevant 
governments).  Howse and Staiger focus on governmental welfare in a public choice 
sense, referring to political pressures and dislocation costs.  
45 But see Lawrence, supra note 12, at 43, stating that “Rebalancing also accords with 
the ideas of trade theory.  By rebalancing, the plaintiff is able to eliminate any 
deterioration in its terms of trade that might have resulted from the violation of the 
agreement.”  
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impossible to be certain that any particular pattern of incentives will result in public-
welfare oriented behavior by government operatives.  Thus, under this uncertainty, there 
seem to be three possible strategies:  
i. Assume that WTO law is already sufficiently aligned with public 
welfare to make it worthwhile to seek remedies that compel 
compliance; that is, the specific performance remedy.  As 
discussed below, this amounts to an assumption that the WTO 
treaty is a reasonably complete contract.  Of course, in the 
domestic setting, we recognize that contracts are never this 
complete, as it is inefficient to write contracts that address every 
possible state of the world.  Therefore, in the domestic setting we 
use courts to enforce contracts and in most cases of breach to 
assess money damages.  This domestic contract approach is similar 
to the approach described in paragraph (ii) below.   
ii. Design a remedy based on public welfare, in the hopes that 
remedies that are congruent with public welfare will cause states to 
act in a manner congruent with public welfare.  Similarly, we 
assume in the domestic system that contract remedies aligned with 
welfare—calculated in terms of lost welfare benefits—will cause 
corporate actors to act in a manner congruent with welfare.46
iii. Design a remedy that is intentionally inconsistent with public 
welfare per se, on the ground that due to public choice problems 
that cause governments to act inconsistently with public welfare-
based incentives, a different calculation of remedies will provide 
incentives for states to act in a manner congruent with public 
welfare.  
We will focus on strategy (ii).  Strategy (i) seems inappropriate for at least some 
areas of WTO law.  Strategy (iii) is a grand complication that imposes a double burden of 
determining first what public welfare is and then structuring a remedy that, in light of 
public choice, conforms with public welfare.  Given the variety of public choice 
problems that states in the WTO may have, it seems unlikely that a single public choice 
structure could induce public welfare-maximizing behavior.  Rather we would expect that 
the best way to provide incentives for public welfare maximizing behavior is to design 
incentives consistent with such behavior.  
Moreover, it seems clear that the present system of remedies in the WTO has no 
particular claims to public choice efficiency.  There is no reason to believe that 
calculation of nullification or impairment in terms of volumes of trade or amounts of 
46
   While firms may be more transparent than states, the assumption that public welfare-
denominated remedies produce public interest maximizing behavior does not seem 
significantly more heroic than the similar assumption in the context of firms.  Indeed, the 
public choice critique is analogous to a critique of the ability of firms to act rationally in 
response to incentives.  
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subsidies approximates the incentives of governmental operatives better than a welfarist 
calculation.  In fact, the opposite seems true.  Under circumstances of uncertainty as to 
the motivations of governmental operatives, it would seem better to assume congruence 
with welfare than to make any other assumption.  At least we hope that governmental 
structures are somewhat accountable to the preferences of citizens in a welfare sense.47
3. Existing WTO Treaty Rules and Jurisprudence of Remedies
The structure of remedies under the WTO treaty exhibits important areas of
continuity with the structure of remedies that developed under GATT from 1947 to 
1994.48  The main characteristic of these remedies is twofold:  first, cessation by the 
respondent of measures that violate WTO law, and second, if the offending measure is 
not terminated in a timely manner, suspension by the complaining state of equivalent 
concessions.49
i. Cessation
The primary remedy of cessation is itself problematic, as it (i) is not clearly stated
in WTO law, (ii) is by its nature only prospective,50 and (iii) is not necessarily associated 
with either justice or efficiency.  The limitation of remedies to prospective ones51 seems 
to provide perverse incentives for violation.  So, a violating state generally has a “free 
ride” for the period from the date the illegal measure is made effective until the 
expiration of the “reasonable period of time” determined under Article 21.3 of the DSU.  
Of course, this reasonable period of time only begins after the Dispute Settlement Body 
has adopted the relevant panel or Appellate Body rulings.  
47
   One further caveat:  a welfare calculation performed by a court seems inconsistent 
with the principle of consumer sovereignty, as it involves interpersonal comparison of 
utility.  
48
   For an in-depth comparison, see Mavroidis, supra note 18.  
49 See ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW:  THE EVOLUTION OF 
THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM (1993).  
50 But see Article 21.5 Panel Report, Australia—Leather, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the 
DSU by the U.S.  (holding that Article 19.1 of the DSU does not limit remedies under 
Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement to purely prospective action).  See Gavin Goh & 
Andreas Ziegler, Retrospective Remedies in the WTO After Automotive Leather, 6
J. INT’L ECON. L. 545 (2003).
51
   There are some exceptions to this limitation, in addition to Australia—Leather.  
During the GATT period, antidumping duties and countervailing duties found to be 
imposed illegally were often recommended to be reimbursed.  See, e.g., United States—
Measures Affecting Imports of Softwood Lumber from Canada, 41 B.I.S.D. 413-15 
(1993); United States—Countervailing Duties on Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Pork from 
Canada, 38 B.I.S.D. 30 (1991); New Zealand—Imports of Electrical Transformers from 
Finland, 32  B.I.S.D. 55 (1985).  This practice was by no means uniform. 
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According to an analysis by the Government of Mexico,52 the average period 
from the establishment of a panel to the adoption of the final panel or Appellate Body 
report in cases involving review under Article 21.5 exceeded 3 years.  If we add (i) the 
period prior to establishment of a panel, (ii) the “reasonable period of time” made 
available to the respondent state, and (iii) the time to obtain authorization to suspend 
concessions, this free ride is lengthy indeed.  
However, cessation is not necessarily congruent with either justice or efficiency.  
For example, in connection with the Hormones case, some may take the view that 
compliance by the EU with WTO law would have been inefficient, and an injustice.  In 
this regard, we might begin to distinguish among different rules of WTO law.  First,
breach of tariff reduction commitments or other de jure protectionist measures, or 
perhaps even some category of clearly protectionist de facto measures, will generally 
reduce welfare, and so might be seen as suitable for a specific performance remedy.53
Second, domestic regulation measures that may violate national treatment requirements 
or MFN requirements, or requirements under the TBT or SPS Agreement, or similar 
requirements under the GATS, may give rise to greater uncertainty regarding welfare, 
and thus may be less suitable for a specific performance remedy.  Finally, of course, non-
violation nullification or impairment may be even more normatively ambivalent.  Under 
current law, there is no obligation to withdraw a measure that results in non-violation 
nullification or impairment.  Export subsidization may be a special case.  Export 
subsidies can rarely harm consuming states in a welfare sense.  They generally harm the 
state conferring the export subsidy, and therefore might be expected, under responsive 
domestic government, to require no legal remedy.  And yet, from a public choice 
perspective, and under strategic trade theory, export subsidies can do harm and can result 
in pressure on other governments to respond in kind.  Therefore, there may be some good 
reason based on the irrational behavior of states for the existing prohibition.  
Thus, considering the following four broad categories of potential violations of 
GATT (or related codes relating to goods), remedies might be approached in the 
following ways:
Type of 
violation
De jure 
excessive 
tariffs 
De jure 
discrimination, 
quotas, or 
other de jure 
“protectionist” 
regulation, 
without 
De facto 
discrimination 
or other de 
facto 
“protectionist” 
regulation or 
de jure 
Non-
Violation 
Nullification 
or 
Impairment
52
   Proposal by Mexico, TN/DS/W/23, November 4, 2002.
53
   Measures of welfare in this context are generally ignorant of distributive 
consequences.  So it may be that even where the measure should be withdrawn in 
accordance with welfare maximization, transaction costs may suggest that it might be 
maintained because those who lose as a result of withdrawal will not otherwise be 
compensated.  
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colorable 
defense
discrimination 
with colorable 
defense
Remedy Specific 
performance
Specific 
performance
Damages Damages
The point is that for measures that are more likely to be welfare-reducing, a mandatory 
remedy, perhaps specific performance, seems appropriate.  In other words, in these areas, 
we would not be greatly concerned with the potentially resulting bilateral monopoly that 
would frustrate negotiations and by default leave the entitlement with the complainant 
state, as this would result in the efficient outcome of cessation.  In other areas in which 
mandatory remedies might be more likely to result in inefficient compliance, a more 
subtle damages mechanism may be required. 
ii. Compensation
Where cessation does not occur, the parties may negotiate “compensation”, which 
is voluntary, under Article 22.2 of the DSU.  This voluntary remedy, used only once 
since the establishment of the WTO,54 is not generally understood to contemplate 
financial compensation.  Rather, compensation is understood to be trade-flow based—the 
expectation is that the losing respondent provides greater liberalization.  However, 
instead of suspension of concessions, this concept involves grant by the respondent of 
substitute concessions.55 One explanation for the infrequent use of this facility may be 
that any compensatory concession would be required to be provided on an MFN basis,56
whereas suspension of concessions under Article 22.6 is only authorized for the 
complaining state, and thus is not provided on an MFN basis.  
iii. Suspension of Concessions 
Where neither withdrawal of the offending measure nor voluntary compensation 
occurs, any party that invoked the dispute settlement procedures may request 
authorization to suspend the application to the respondent of concessions or other 
obligations under the covered agreements.  The suspension of concessions is not 
automatically available to all injured states.  
Under Article 22.4 of the DSU, “The level of the suspension of concessions or 
other obligations authorized by the DSB shall be equivalent to the level of the 
54
  Japan—Alcoholic Beverages, Mutually Acceptable Solution on Modalities for 
Implementation, WT/DS8/17, January 12, 1998 (providing autonomous tariff reduction).
55
   For a proposal to pre-establish the type of compensation that would be granted, see
Lawrence, supra note 12 (proposing pre-negotiated “contingent liberalization 
commitments”).  
56
   It is required to be “consistent with the covered agreements,” which include 
obligations of MFN treatment.  
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nullification or impairment.”  This is the sole guidance provided by the DSU as to the 
calculation of remedies.57
It seems strange, and it is not required or even suggested by the text of Article 
22.4, that the level of nullification or impairment is considered only prospectively,58
rather than from the commencement of the violation.  While all arbitrations considering 
the level of nullification or impairment under Article 22.6 have assumed that the 
remedies they authorize are limited to prospective nullification or impairment,59 the panel 
in Australia-Leather rejected arguments that an arcane reading of Article 19 of the DSU 
permitted only remedies that involved prospective action.60
Furthermore, diplomats and other practitioners seem to think of WTO remedies as 
intended to implement “rebalancing.”  It would be a strange rebalancing that was solely 
prospective in its regard.  If this were the only parameter to consider, it would be patent 
that remedies in the WTO legal system are insufficient to provide incentives to comply.  
It is comparable to a law against theft that simply requires the thief to return the stolen 
property once caught.  
The reference to “the level of the nullification or impairment,” following GATT 
“lore,” has generally been taken to mean the volume of blocked trade.  However, recall 
that withdrawal of concessions was only authorized once in the GATT era (from 1947 to 
1994), and in that case, the panel had regard to the value of the trade involved, and 
“broader elements in the impairment suffered by the Netherlands.”61  In the WTO era, 
arbitrators have sought to equate the value of imports to be blocked by the complaining 
57
   However, arbitral panels have found that language in the SCM Agreement provides a 
special regime for remedies in response to export subsidies. See, e.g., Brazil—Export 
Financing Programme for Aircraft, Recourse to Arbitration by Brazil, WT/DS46/ARB, 
21 August 2000; United States—Tax Treatment for ‘Foreign Sales Corporations,’ 
Recourse to Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article 
4.11 of the SCM Agreement—Decision by the Arbitrators, WT/DS108/ARB, 30 August 
2002.  
58
   This appears to have been the “understanding” in the GATT era.  See ROBERT E. 
HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW:  THE EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN 
GATT SYSTEM __ (1993).  This “understanding” was followed under the WTO, in 
Bananas.  Report of the Panel, European Communities—Regime for the Importation, 
Sale and Distribution of Bananas—Recourse to Article 21.5 by Ecuador, 
WT/DS27/RW/ECU, para. 6.105 (April 12, 1999).
59 But see Panel Report, Canada—Aircraft, WT/DS222/R, adopted February 19, 2002.
60
   Article 21.5 Panel Report, Australia—Leather, Recourse to Article 21.5 by the United 
States.  Both the U.S. and Australia argued against the retrospective component of this 
decision, and the panel report was severely criticized by some member states.  See
Minutes of Meeting, Held in Centre William Rappard on February 11, 2000, 
WT/DSB/M/75.  
61
   Netherlands—Measures of Suspension of Obligations to the United States, BISD 
1S/32-33.  
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state to the value of the complaining state’s exports blocked by the respondent state’s 
WTO-inconsistent measure.  In a useful analysis, Spamann shows that arbitrators fail to 
achieve even this equivalence, and shows that blocked trade, as opposed to affected trade, 
is an artificially limited category.62
iv. Summary
To summarize the WTO system of remedies analytically, we might use the 
following approach, focusing initially on incentives to states as “billiard balls.”  A second 
layer of analysis would examine incentives to firms or other constituencies within the 
state.  
States would be expected to comply if the global payoff from defection is less 
than the value of bilateral prospective suspension of concessions plus multilateral 
reputation.  Under the present system, as described above, states would be expected to 
comply if 
pspb + rm > dm
where 
spb = the value of bilateral prospective suspension of concessions, multiplied by a 
discount rate to reflect the delay between the occurrence of injury and the effectiveness of 
the suspension of concessions.  
p = the probability of enforcement, where 0<p<1
rm = the value of multilateral reputation effects
dm = the global payoff to defection
We have suggested above that there is some question about the two subscripts of 
s:  whether suspension of concessions is related only to prospective nullification or 
impairment and whether it is merely bilateral.  Here, by bilateral, we refer to the last 
sentence of Article 22.2 of the DSU, permitting only those member states that have 
“invoked the dispute settlement procedures” to “request authorization from the DSB to 
62
   Holger Spamann, The Myth of ‘Rebalancing’ Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement, 
working paper dated January 11, 2005.  Spamann analyzes arbitration decisions, finding 
that WTO retaliation authorizations are “random.”  Specifically, “Article 22.6 decisions 
use an underspecified trade effects comparator and asymmetric measurements of 
nullification and suspension, respectively.  As a result, equivalence of the levels of 
nullification and suspension is defined by comparisons of numbers that refer to entirely 
different things.”  Id. at 2.  Jackson has also found that rebalancing is a fallacy.  John H. 
Jackson, International Law Status of WTO Dispute Settlement Reports:  Obligation to 
Comply or Option to ‘Buy Out’, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 109, 121-22 (2004).
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suspend the application to the Member concerned of concessions or other obligations 
under the covered agreements.”63  In the next section, we address the question of 
valuation of nullification or impairment, and therefore of suspension of concessions.  
Many have pointed out that it is unlikely that spb would exceed dm—that the value 
of bilateral suspension of concessions would exceed global payoffs to defection.  
Kovenock and Thursby have suggested that rm must fill the gap, as we observe substantial 
compliance.  But the compliance that they observe is with rulings themselves after a case 
has been brought and concluded.  Obviously, the complaining state will always be left 
inadequately compensated by spb.  Perhaps more saliently, compliance with rulings is not 
necessarily enough to address the losses of complainants—the reputational effect that 
rulings seem to invoke comes too late.  States have a significant period of free-riding.  It 
may be hypothesized that reputation or international obligation builds up and induces 
states to avoid repeat violations in order to avoid a reputation as a “scofflaw.”  But 
without data supporting this hypothesis, we have the remaining problem of non-
compliance:  of theft where the only obligation is to give back the stolen property some 
time after adjudication.  [check new Busch-Reinhardt paper]
Different kinds of violations will entail varying probabilities of enforcement, and 
different probabilities of reputational consequences with other states.  We have not 
reflected the costs of litigation.  
Finally, as Guzman points out, at least some portion of what might be understood 
to be rm does not accrue to the benefit of the complainant.64  In Guzman’s model, lost 
“reputation” is not recovered by anyone.  An alternative approach, which understands 
reputation as information regarding the suitability of the respondent as a counter-party, 
would see a collective action problem in connection with the production of this 
information.  The point is that the amount of spb that, when added to rm  is sufficient to 
induce compliance may not be sufficient to compensate the complainant.  
States would be expected to comply optimally, and to breach efficiently, where 
damages are set to equal the obligees’ expectations:  an expectation measure of damages.  
Where it is difficult to calculate this measure, and where negotiations between the parties 
would be expected to arrive at this measure at lower costs, specific performance may be 
preferred.  
Below, this paper suggests the following method of calculating damages, resulting 
in a measure of damages equal to the value of multilateral injury resulting from the 
63
   This is true of formal sanctions.  Obviously, informal sanctions (or at least those 
permitted by Article 23 of the DSU) may be multilateral.  See Giovanni Maggi, The Role 
of Multilateral Institutions in International Trade Cooperation, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 190 
(1999).   
64
   Andrew T. Guzman, The Cost of Credibility:  Explaining Resistance to Interstate 
Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, 31 J. LEG. STUDS. 303 (2002).  
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violation, both retrospectively and prospectively, plus interest, and increased by a 
multiplier to reflect the uncertainty of enforcement.  
p
1 cmt  + e = md
where 
cmt = the value of multilateral injury caused by the violation, ex tunc (including 
both retrospective and prospective components), plus interest from the date of injury
p = the probability of enforcement
e = cost of enforcement
md = measure of damages
On first analysis, it appears that where cmt < dm, states should be encouraged to violate.  
Therefore, in these cases, the role of reputation is problematic.  Interestingly, where 
formal remedies are set right, reputation may impede the achievement of efficiency.65
[Stephan/Scott point that formal competes with informal] On the other hand, reputation 
may reflect a wider context in which there is value to compliance even where the 
individual act of compliance is inefficient:  there may be real value in upholding the 
system of promises even if it results in a cost within the narrow case.  
Alternatively, it may be that where a state pays the appropriate level of damages, 
reputational effects would be diminished to near zero.  After all, if the obligee is made 
indifferent by the appropriate measure of damages, why would others decline to deal with 
the obligor in the future, or impose other “reputational” or informal responses or 
penalties?  This seems even more correct if we distinguish among WTO law rules as 
suggested above.  Reputational sanctions might still apply where a state fails to comply 
with rules that can be understood as property rights, whereas if a rule is understood as a 
liability rule perhaps no reputational sanction would attach.  
b. Calculation of Nullification or Impairment and Suspension of Concessions
There have only been eight arbitrations of the magnitude of nullification or 
impairment and suspension of concessions under Article 22.6 of the DSU as of the date 
of this article, and three of those involved export subsidies under what the arbitrators held 
were special rules.  
In the export subsidies cases, the arbitrators authorized suspension of concessions 
in amounts (a) related to the magnitude of the global subsidy, and (b) designed to compel 
compliance, based on an incorrect reading of the SCM Agreement.  For example, in 
65
   This may help to explain the move to restrict extra-judicial remedies in Article 23 of 
the DSU.  
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Brazil—Aircraft,  the panel determined that nullification or impairment is not the correct 
reference in export subsidies cases.  It used as its reference the amount of the subsidy, in 
order to enhance the efficacy of countermeasures in the special case of prohibited 
subsidies.66 In effect, in the export subsidies cases, the arbitrators crafted a property rule, 
and tried to calculate suspension of concessions in order to compel compliance.  
The relevant text is Article 22.4 of the DSU, which simply requires that the level 
of suspension of concessions or other obligations authorized be “equivalent” to the level 
of the nullification or impairment.  
During the GATT period, the relevant text, GATT Art. XXIII:2, specified that the 
contracting parties could authorize the suspension of “such concessions or other 
obligations under [GATT] as they determine to be appropriate in the circumstances.”
Thus, the reference was to “appropriate” concessions, rather than concessions 
“equivalent” to the level of nullification or impairment.  However, in the 1952 
Netherlands case, “the Working Party was instructed by the CONTRACTING PARTIES 
to investigate the appropriateness of the measure which the Netherlands Government 
proposed to take, having regard to the equivalence to the impairment suffered by the 
Netherlands as a result of the United States restrictions.”67  Thus, the distance between 
“appropriate” and “equivalent” under GATT may not have been great.  Today, we might 
interpret “appropriate” in GATT Art. XXIII:2 by reference to the general international 
law of state responsibility, as evidenced by the Rules of State Responsibility.  
In the context of export subsidies, also, the relevant standard appears to be 
“appropriate” pursuant to Article 4.10 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures.  This reference could also have been taken as a reference to Article 22.4, but it 
has not been.  Rather, arbitrators interpreting “appropriate” in the context of Article 4.10 
have focused on the context there of illegal export subsidies and have held that remedies 
should be designed to compel compliance.  Therefore, in the FSC case, they authorized 
retaliation by a single member in respect of the amount of global subsidization.  
66
   Decision of the Arbitrators, Brazil—Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, 
Recourse to Arbitration by Brazil, WT/DS46/ARB, August 21, 2000, paras. 3.58, 3.54-
3.60.  See also Decision of the Arbitrators, United States—Tax Treatment for ‘Foreign 
Sales Corporations,’ Recourse to Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of 
the DSU and Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement—Decision by the Arbitrators, 
WT/DS108/ARB, 30 August 2002; Decision by the Arbitrator, Canada—Export Credits 
and Loan Gurantees for Regional Aircraft—Recourse to Arbitration by Canada under 
Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement, WT/DS222/ARB 
(February 17, 2003).  
67
   Netherlands Action under Article XXIII:2 to Suspend Obligations to the United 
States, Report of the Working Party, November 8, 1952, 1B.I.S.D. 62 (1953).
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It appears that “equivalent” is a less complex, less nuanced, comparator than 
“appropriate.”68 In the EC—Bananas III (U.S.) case, the arbitrators first sought to define 
“equivalence” under Art. 22.4, based on dictionary entries: 
We note that the ordinary meaning of the word "equivalence" is "equal in value, 
significance or meaning", "having the same effect", "having the same relative 
position or function", "corresponding to", "something equal in value or worth", 
also "something tantamount or virtually identical". Obviously, this meaning 
connotes a correspondence, identity or balance between two related levels, i.e. 
between the level of the concessions to be suspended, on the one hand, and the 
level of the nullification or impairment, on the other.69
This passage contains a number of ideas about the meaning of equivalence between 
nullification or impairment and the suspension of concessions, but it does not respond to 
the essential problem of interpreting this language in context.  The arbitrators found that 
correspondence is the key meaning, without asking which value should “correspond,” 
and without paying attention to the dictionary language regarding “equal in value” and 
“having the same effect.”  This language would lead to an examination of the effects of 
trade barriers and the reasons for valuing free trade in accordance with WTO 
commitments.  However, without discussion, the arbitrators assumed that the U.S. level 
of suspension is “clear”,70 implicitly assuming that equivalence is to be determined in 
terms of the magnitude of the barriers, not in terms of the value of the barriers.  
One approach that the arbitrators did not use is to refer to the general international 
law meaning of the coordinate concept, as reflected in the Rules of State Responsibility.  
Art. 36 of the Rules provides for compensation, stating that “The compensation shall 
cover any financially assessable damage including loss of profits insofar as it is 
established.” Although it may be argued that the reference to “equivalence” in Article 
22.4 is different from “compensation,” there is no reason to think that by use of the term 
“equivalent” the member states intended to provide for something more or less than 
“compensation.”  Rather, compensation might well be understood to entail equivalence.  
In this sense, Article 22.4 might be understood simply to invoke, with a different word, 
the customary international law concept of compensation reflected in the Rules.  Recall 
also that the parties are intended to negotiate “compensation” under Article 22.2 of the 
68
   In fact, in international investment law, “appropriate compensation” was famous as an 
agreed term by which states “agreed to disagree,” holding that it meant different things.  
See Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803, U.N. 
GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962).  This debate obviously 
came after the drafting of the GATT.  
69
   Decision by the Arbitrators, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, 
Sale and Distribution of Bananas – Recourse to Arbitration by the European 
Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS27/ARB, April 9, 1999, para. 4.1, 
citing The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (1993), page 843 [Bananas 22.6 
U.S.].
70
   Bananas 22.6 U.S., para. 4.2; see also para. 7.1.  
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DSU.  It would seem likely that the drafters of the DSU expected that each side would 
negotiate “compensation” under Article 22.2 under the shadow of “equivalence” under 
Article 22.4.  Thus, it would be unrealistic to expect different measures, and it is not 
unreasonable to use the customary international law meaning of “compensation” to 
inform our understanding of “equivalence.”  
The arbitrators in EC -Bananas III (U.S.) used the prospective gross value of lost 
exports from the U.S. to the EU as the measure of nullification or impairment.71  It 
specifically declined to consider other losses, including U.S. losses due to loss of exports 
to third countries.72 Furthermore, as Spamann points out, a focus on lost exports, instead 
of affected exports, may artificially and significantly reduce the level of possible 
retaliatory suspension of concessions.73  A focus on lost trade to the exclusion of affected 
trade would tend to ignore substantial terms of trade effects.  
EC-Bananas III (U.S.) has been followed by subsequent arbitrations in terms of 
the focus (outside of export subsidy cases) on lost exports, rather than other possible 
measures of damages.  
In the Hormones case,74 the arbitrators also used a “but for” approach to 
comparing the amount of exports that existed, and the amount of exports that would have 
been made “but for” the EC’s measure.  The arbitrators focused on trade flows. 75
Of course, Ecuador had significant problems in utilizing rights to retaliate against 
the EC in Bananas.76 Here, the arbitrators specifically stated that they could not 
determine equivalence beyond trade in goods and services under Articles 22.6 and 22.7.  
Therefore, the arbitrators could not estimate the magnitude of non-compliance with 
TRIPS.77 The arbitrators’ position seems inconsistent with their explicit mandate.  
Furthermore, the arbitrators specifically noted that they did not consider lost profits as 
part of their calculation.78 It is rumored that Ecuador was granted certain non-WTO 
benefits in order informally to settle this case.  
71
   Bananas 22.6 U.S., paras. 6.12, 7.1.
72
   Bananas 22.6 U.S., para. 6.12.
73
   Spamann, supra note 62, at 8.  
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   Decision by the Arbitrators, European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat 
and Meat Products (Hormones) – Original Complaint by the United States – Recourse to 
Arbitration by the European Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU, T/DS26/ARB, 
July 12, 1999 [Hormones 22.6 U.S.].
75 Id., para. 42.  
76
   Decision by the Arbitrators, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, 
Sale and Distribution of Bananas – Recourse to Arbitration by the European 
Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS27/ARB/ECU, March 24, 2000.
77 Id., para. 159.
78 Id., at footnote 52. 
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In the 1916 Act case, the EC proposed mirror legislation in order to avoid the 
difficulty of quantifying the effects of the U.S. prohibition on dumping.79 The arbitrators 
rejected this qualitative approach, on the ground that it could result in a greater-than-
equivalent quantity of retaliation.  The arbitrators agreed that the quantity of nullification 
or impairment would be equal to the amount of future judgments entered against, or 
settlements accepted by, EC exporters under the U.S. law.80  The arbitrators did not 
evaluate how a monetary sum representing the nullification or impairment by the U.S. 
could be translated into the anticipated suspension of trade concessions in retaliation by 
the EC.  The arbitrators seemed to assume a “dollar-for-dollar” correspondence.  
However, from the EC standpoint, one would imagine that it would rather have a dollar 
than the right to block a dollar’s worth of trade.  
In a case outside of Article 22.6, the U.S.—Copyright case,81 monetary 
compensation was granted.  This arbitration took place under Article 25 of the DSU, but 
the mandate to the arbitrators was to determine the level of nullification or impairment of 
benefits to the EC.  In the special case of TRIPS, where the claim related to a failure to 
protect intellectual property rights that give rise to royalty payments, there was little 
alternative but to resort to monetary compensation of approximately $1 million per year.
4. Building the WTO Cathedral:  Property Rules, Liability Rules, Efficient Breach 
and Auctions
Economic analysis of law has enhanced our understanding of contract and tort, as 
well as other areas of law, by focusing analysis on incentives and consequences.  We thus 
return to the question, raised above, of whether WTO law operates as a property rule or 
as a liability rule.82  It will be recalled that in 1972, Guido Calabresi and Douglas 
Melamed suggested that while property rules might promote efficient exchange under 
low transaction costs, liability rules promote efficient exchange under high transaction 
costs.83 As we examine remedies in the WTO, it is useful to draw on this literature in 
order to understand the incentive effects of various possible approaches to remedies.  
a. Interpreting and Applying WTO Law
79
   Decision by the Arbitrators, United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 –
Original Complaint by the European Communities – Recourse to Arbitration by the 
United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS136/ARB, February 24, 2004 [1916 
Act 22.6].
80 Id., para. 5.60.
81 Award of the Arbitrators, United States - Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, 
Recourse to Arbitration under DSU Article 25, WT/DS160/ARB25/1, November 9, 2001.
82
   John Jackson first raised this question in 1969.  JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE
AND THE LAW OF GATT 170 (1969).  
83
   Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 22.  
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Before we develop a normative analysis, however, it is useful to examine the 
debate over the existing doctrinal requirements.  Here, we must carefully distinguish 
between the law as legislated and the law in action.  
John Jackson,84 Jide Nzelibe85 and others argue that the correct reading of WTO 
law is that something approximating a property rule applies, rather than a liability rule.  
That is, according to their interpretation, WTO law is mandatory law and states are not 
permitted to violate even if they accept the consequences of suspension of concessions.  
Although not free from doubt,86 this is probably the better interpretation of existing WTO 
law.  
However, this position requires us to begin to distinguish between authority and 
power.  Even if we assume that this interpretation is correct, a legal realist, and a legal 
economist, would ask not what the formal law specifies, but what it does in response to 
breach.  Ubi ius ibi remedium. Here, the law in action clearly does not operate as a 
property rule.  
States violate WTO law, and they are not subject to enforceable specific 
performance-type remedies, nor do they experience any greater penalty for their 
violation, outside of the SCM Agreement context.   So, as a matter of fact and practice, if 
not as a matter of legal doctrine, the WTO legal system is best characterized as 
employing a liability rule, rather than a property rule.  In fact, the Director-General of the 
WTO, Pascal Lamy, has stated that “[a]s long as you pay the penalties, you can go on as 
you are.”87  A former director of the WTO Legal Affairs Division, Pieter Jan Kuyper, has 
suggested that “we should go in the direction of accepting compensation and suspension 
of concessions as full alternatives to compliance. . . .”88
Doctrinally, WTO arbitration panels have rejected the concept of punitive 
damages.89 They have also rejected the possibility of damages that exceed the value of 
the violation in order to compel compliance, except, as discussed above, in connection 
with export subsidies under a curious interpretation of the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures.  It should be noted, however, that outside of the SCM 
84
   Jackson, supra note 62.  
85
   Jide Nzelibe, The Credibility Imperative:  The Political Dynamics of Retaliation in 
the World Trade Organization’s Dispute Resolution Mechanism, 6 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES IN LAW 215 (2005).  
86 See the textual counterargument provided by Schwartz and Sykes, supra note 32, at 
190.  
87
   EU Press and Communication Service, N. 3036, May 23, 2000.  
88
   Pieter Jan Kuyper, Remedies and Retaliation in the WTO:  Are They Likely to Be 
Effective?, 1997 ASIL PROCEEDINGS 282, 284 (1997).  See also Charnovitz, supra note 
12, at 820.   
89 See, e.g., Decision by the Arbitrators, Regime for the Importation, Sale and 
Distribution of Bananas—Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities under 
Article 22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS27/ARB, paras. 6.1-6.3 (April 9, 1999).
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Agreement, there is no question of authorizing suspension of concessions greater than a 
level equivalent to the nullification or impairment.90  Thus, doctrinally, it appears that 
there is no general property rule at WTO law.  
In addition, as discussed above, while the Rules of State Responsibility generally 
require restitution, which would be consistent with a property rule, they also provide no 
basis for punitive damages or the enforcement of specific performance through 
compelling remedies.  While the International Court of Justice in the Chorzow Factory
case suggested the remedy of restitution,91 this remedy has not been common in the 
international investment context or in the broader international law context.  Rather, a 
rule of damages—of liability—is common in practice.  
b. Property Rules and Liability Rules 
In the domestic system, we distinguish between property rules and liability rules 
on the basis that liability rules are subject to the unilateral choice of an actor to violate the 
rule and incur the liability.  The owner of the entitlement that is protected by a liability 
rule cannot object to the action, but must accept the payment of damages.  Liability rules 
require, in order to operate, that courts are available to determine the value of the 
damages.  They are therefore dependent on an appropriate institutional structure.  
Property rules, on the other hand, protect the entitlement unless the owner consents to its 
taking.  We often assume (perhaps incorrectly) that property rules are backed by 
injunctive or specific performance remedies.
From a neoclassical economics standpoint, some might assume that in the WTO 
context, a property rule, supported by specific performance or by enormous punitive 
damages, would yield greatest efficiency.  After all, there is no proposition more 
commonly accepted in economics than the fundamental theorem of welfare economics, 
which in our context argues that reduction of barriers to trade increases welfare.  Yet we 
must challenge an implicit assumption of this perspective.  The implicit assumption is 
that compliance with WTO law maximizes welfare.  This assumption might generally be 
true of tariff reduction and quota elimination obligations.92  But WTO law today includes 
a wide variety of obligations, some of which are quite ambivalent from a welfare 
standpoint.  One need only consider the requirements of the TRIPS agreement, or the 
restrictions on domestic regulation under the SPS and TBT Agreements.  As suggested 
above, we should begin to discriminate among these various obligations.  
90 See 1916 Act 22.6, supra note 79, at para. 5.8.
91
   Case Concerning the Factory at Chrozow (Ger. V. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17 
(Judgment of Sept. 13).
92
   Indeed, we might note that with respect to tariff bindings and de jure quotas, 
compliance in the WTO legal system seems quite good, and approximates what would 
result from a property rule.  This may be because in connection with these clear rules, 
violation would entail much greater reputational consequences than might be expected in 
connection with more nuanced rules.  
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Now, there is a difference between (i) automatic and compelling specific 
performance—a requirement that parties comply without any opportunity for 
renegotiation—and (ii) specific performance as a bargaining chip.  Many international 
lawyers see WTO law as absolute in its requirement for compliance, without the 
possibility for renegotiation.  We might understand this as a rule of inalienable property 
rights.  This would be broadly inefficient, as it would deny the possibility of efficient 
breach in appropriate cases.  However, the possibility of specific performance as a 
bargaining chip is not necessarily inefficient. Rather, it gives rise to the requirement to 
negotiate with the holder of the entitlement.  
The WTO Agreement has been compared to a contract.93 If the WTO “contract” 
reflected efficiency—if it were a complete contract—then the prescription would be 
clear:  compel performance through a remedy of specific performance.  The WTO 
contract, however, is not by any means complete.  The dispute settlement system, 
including its remedies, may be understood as a means of providing further articulation of 
the contract.  
On the other hand, as suggested above, some components of the WTO contract 
may be understood as complete, such as the tariff bindings and the prohibition on de jure 
discrimination and de jure quotas (where a colorable argument for exception exists, the 
contract becomes incomplete).  Under these circumstances, it may well be that specific 
performance is the correct remedy.  
Under incompleteness, however, it is not clear that specific performance is the 
efficient remedy.94  In fact, the parties to the WTO agreement did not indicate specific 
performance as the remedy, but rather established the possibility for compensation and 
countermeasures and failed explicitly to require compliance.95  Furthermore, there are 
93
   Appellate Body Report, Japan—Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS/8,10,11/AB/R, adopted 
November 1, 1996, at 15.
94
   Paul G. Mahoney, Contract Remedies, in Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, 
available at http://encyclo.findlaw.com/4600book.pdf.  
95
   It is not the purpose of this article to make a doctrinal argument regarding whether 
compliance is required under the DSU.  However, if the member states wished to provide 
for an absolute obligation of compliance, they failed to express it clearly within the DSU.  
Many substantive provisions of the WTO treaty are phrased in mandatory terms.  
However, the mandatory nature of these substantive obligations might be understood to 
be qualified by the general language of the DSU.  For example, Article 22.1 of the DSU 
states that “neither compensation nor the suspension of concessions or other obligations 
is preferred to full implementation of a recommendation to bring a measure into 
conformity with the covered agreements.”  That other outcomes are “not preferred” is a 
circular way of saying that cessation is required. Furthermore, as reflected in Article 22.1, 
where a respondent loses a case, the panel or Appellate Body merely “recommends” 
cessation under Article 19 of the DSU.  On the other hand, Hudec states that “[d]espite 
the softer connotation of the word ‘recommendation,’ the traditional understanding of the 
word ‘recommendation’ in GATT/WTO jurisprudence has been that, when approved by 
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specific provisions for “escape” and renegotiation in specific areas:  for example, the 
safeguards provisions of Article XIX of GATT and the renegotiation provisions of 
Article XXVIII.  
Under circumstances where specific performance is unavailable, or where there 
are no additional penalties for non-compliance beyond equivalent compensation, there is 
little difference between a liability regime and a property regime.  That is, in a world 
without specific performance or punitive damages, the liability rule applies as a matter of 
law in action.  On the other hand, the debate over whether states have the authority or 
power to “buy out” their WTO obligations is a struggle over reputational sanctions.  If it 
is understood that “international obligation” applies regardless of the authorization of 
retaliation or the provision of compensation, then states that follow this route will incur 
reputational costs.  
In the WTO context, a liability rule would mean that a state may violate WTO 
law, so long as it pays the damages, or accepts the suspension of concessions.  In the 
domestic system, we often assume that a property right is absolute:  if property is taken 
from us without our consent, a court will order that it be given back.  Of course, the
actual remedies in domestic law may be somewhat less clear than the theory supposes.  
The procedural requirement for specific performance or an injunction is a demonstration 
that damages are inadequate to right the wrong.96  So not every property right will have 
the characteristics anticipated by theory.  
As Schwartz and Sykes point out, the normative goal of any system of contract 
remedies is to deter inefficient breaches—those that impose greater costs on the 
promissee than benefits on the promisor—and to promote efficient breaches—those that 
impose lower costs on the promissee than benefits on the promisor.97  Note that this 
formulation is unconcerned with distributive consequences.  In the area of remedies for 
antitrust law violation, a similar concept is often discussed in terms of “type 1 error”
(false negative) and “type 2 error” (false positive).  Type 1 error fails to induce efficient 
compliance.  Type 2 error induces inefficient compliance.98
Schwartz and Sykes refer to contracts theory which suggests that under 
circumstances where liability would be difficult to measure, a property rule would be 
favored.99 They argue that because a property rule would require negotiations with each 
the plenary body acting for the full membership, it is a legally binding order.”  Robert E. 
Hudec, Broadening the Scope of Remedies in WTO Dispute Settlement, in IMPROVING 
WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES (Friedl Weiss & Jochem Wiers, eds.) (London, 
Cameron May Publishers, 2000) at 345-376.  
96
   Emily Sherwin, Introduction:  Property Rules as Remedies, 106 YALE L.J. 2083, 2085 
(1997).
97
   Schwartz & Sykes, supra note 32, at 181.
98 Id. at 201-202.
99 Id. at 187.  
30
WTO member state (148 as of August 26, 2005) under the MFN principle, the transaction 
costs and holdout problems would be excessive.  
However, the MFN principle would not necessarily operate in this context to 
require universal member consent to a bilateral settlement that required worse treatment 
of the respondent’s goods, as opposed to better treatment of the complainant’s.  Say that 
the EC is found to have violated U.S. rights under the SPS Agreement in connection with 
GMOs.  And say that it is understood as an entitlement under the conventional 
understanding of the requirements for compliance under the DSU:  the U.S. has the right 
to force the EC to comply.  The normal WTO remedy would be for the U.S. to impose 
barriers only on goods from the EC, under Article 3.7 of the DSU.  If the parties 
negotiated a specified level of U.S. import barriers, applicable only to EC goods, it is not 
clear that the EC would be required to negotiate with other states.  Article I of GATT 
requires that any “advantage, favour, privilege or immunity” be accorded to like products 
imported any other contracting party.  Thus, although it is not free from doubt, MFN 
might well be understood to allow states to be accorded less favorable treatment with 
their consent—other states would not be required to consent.100 On the other hand, if the 
“compensation” in our hypothetical took the form of special market opening by the EC, it 
is not clear that the EC would be required to negotiate with every other state—it would 
just be required under Article I to accord the same treatment.  This feature would 
certainly make compensation unappealing in many cases. 
Even if as a technical legal matter bilateral or plurilateral settlement agreements 
were to violate WTO law, it is not clear that other states would intervene, or experience 
any nullification or impairment.  This may depend on the extent of trade deflection.
In any event, there may be problems associated with bilateral monopoly (as 
opposed to holdouts resulting from the requirement to negotiate with all WTO members) 
that make it difficult to reach efficient solutions under a property rule.101
On the other hand, while the public choice-based damages on which Schwartz and 
Sykes focus may be especially difficult to calculate, it is not clear that public interest-
based damages would be more difficult to calculate than certain types of contract or 
antitrust damages.  We return to this point below.  
Schwartz and Sykes conclude that the modifications to WTO dispute settlement 
that were made in the Uruguay Round were intended to provide for a liability rule, and to 
set limits on retaliation.  Limits on retaliation would reduce the possibility for inefficient 
compliance.  Schwartz and Sykes argue that three forces induce compliance separately 
from multilaterally-authorized suspension of concessions.  These forces are (i) rising 
100
   A bilateral agreement allowing an importing state to withdraw concessions to a 
single exporting state might be argued to violate Article 11 of the Safeguards Agreement.  
101 See Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral: The Dominance of Property 
Rules, 106 YALE L. J. 2091, 2092 (1997). 
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domestic costs of violations, especially after initial liberalization, (ii) reputation, and (iii) 
unilateral retaliation.  
Schwartz and Sykes seem to suggest that these forces were in place before 1994, 
and that they persist after 1994 in order to induce compliance.  Thus, they believe that 
multilateral authorization of remedies was not necessary to add to the forces that induce 
compliance.  Rather, they suggest that the modifications in 1995 to make multilaterally-
authorized suspension of concessions a more likely result were intended to limit
retaliation, not to increase it.  According to Schwartz and Sykes, the innovation of the 
DSU was to provide “the opportunity for the losing disputant to ‘buy out’ of the violation 
at a price set by an arbitrator who has examined carefully the question of what sanctions 
are substantially equivalent to the harm done by the violation.”102  The result is to protect 
the respondent from excessive retaliation, and increases opportunities for efficient breach.  
However, there is no basis to believe that the magnitude of retaliation set by the 
arbitrators is correctly calibrated to induce efficient breach and efficient compliance.103
c. The Conditions for Efficient Breach under a Liability Rule
Schwartz and Sykes explore the possibility that the existing WTO system of 
remedies is consistent with the law and economics theory of contracts that suggests the 
possibility of efficient breach.104  Their approach does not follow a welfare economics 
approach to efficient breach, but instead uses a public choice lens to evaluate the 
efficiency of breach in terms of the utility functions of political operatives.  They argue
doctrinally that the WTO system is, and normatively that it should be, more like a 
liability rule than a property rule.  That is, the liability rule would induce states to comply 
when it is “efficient” (in public choice, as opposed to welfare, terms) to do so, and to 
breach when that is “efficient.”  Schwartz and Sykes suggest that the theory of efficient 
breach is equally applicable in the context of trade agreements, despite the inability to 
monetize costs and benefits.105
In fact, in standard law and economics theory, under incompleteness, an 
expectation measure of damages is understood to lead to efficient decisions by a promisor 
to perform or breach an existing contract, given a fixed level of reliance.106 Perfect 
expectation damages would make the obligee indifferent between performance and 
102
   Schwartz & Sykes, supra note 32, at 201.  
103 See Spamann, supra note 62.
104
   Schwartz & Sykes, supra note 
105 Id. at 184.  “Although this theory of efficient performance and nonperformance has 
been developed with reference to private contracts, where the costs and benefits of 
performance may be measured in money, it applies equally to bargains such as trade 
agreements.”
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   Mahoney, supra note 94, citing John H. Barton, The Economic Basis of Damages for 
Breach of Contract, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 277 (1972); Steven Shavell, Damage Measures 
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The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEG. STUD. 1 (1989).  
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breach.107 “Perfect expectation damages equal the gain that the promisee who relied 
optimally would have obtained from performance.”108
However, there are some important conditions that must be satisfied in order for 
efficient breach to operate.  Efficient breach under a liability rule109 depends on the 
ability of a third party, such as a court, to determine a level of damages that will 
approximate the level of liability that will best distinguish between efficient and 
inefficient breach.110  Thus, in contract theory, efficient breach is dependent on 
calculation of the objective value of expectations of the non-breaching party.  Similarly, 
in trade, efficient breach is dependent on calculation of the objective value of 
expectations of the non-breaching state.  
It is critical that Schwartz and Sykes’ theory operates in the world of public 
choice, where the values exchanged and disputed are political welfare of political 
officials, rather than necessarily economic welfare of constituents.  These values are 
calculated in votes, campaign contributions or graft.  Thus, there is no court that can 
determine “damages” in political welfare terms.  Schwartz and Sykes accept this,111 but 
this distinction limits the scope of utility of the efficient breach concept.  That is, we may 
presume efficient breach, but because we have no way of identifying the actual value of 
breach, as we do in private contracts, we cannot determine whether any particular breach 
is or is not efficient.  This limits substantially the ability of society to realize the benefits 
of efficient breach.  
Using a public choice-based measure of damages in trade law would be 
equivalent to using a measure of damages in inter-corporate litigation that reflected the 
concerns of management, rather than the welfare-based lost profits or expectation 
damages that are actually used.  
In short, liability rules rely on quantification to operate.  How can actors 
determine whether their breach is indeed efficient without a possibility of quantification 
so that they may compare the benefits of breach with the resultant liability?  If the 
resultant liability is relatively inaccurate or unreliable, parties may make inefficient 
decisions.  Of course, under zero transaction costs, parties will presumably negotiate to 
an efficient outcome regardless of the liability for breach.  But our working assumption is 
that positive transaction costs make the actual rule of liability meaningful for efficiency.   
107 ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 226 (3d ed. 1999).
108 Id. at 246.
109
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d. The Limits of Auctions, Contingent Liberalization Commitments and 
Fines
An auction of the right to retaliate, as suggested by Bagwell, Mavroides and 
Staiger,112 and by the Government of Mexico,113 may solve important problems, 
including the problem that developing countries may find the right to retaliate less useful 
than do developed countries.  However, the value of the right to retaliate is not 
necessarily related to the welfare value of the violation. The incentive effects of an 
auction of a (miscalculated) right to retaliate could be perverse.  So if the amount of the 
retaliation right that is auctioned is calculated separately from  welfare effects, there can 
be no guarantee that an auction will enhance efficiency.  Where the level of suspension of 
concessions is calculated by reference to welfare, an auction of the right to retaliate may 
substitute for direct payment of cash, and may therefore solve some problems of 
enforcement.  However, it would leave in place the possibility of welfare-reducing 
retaliation unless the respondent wins the auction, retiring the right to retaliate unused.
Using a general-equilibrium model, Bagwell and Staiger show that the balance of 
concessions is restored when a retaliatory action is large enough to restore the offending 
country’s original terms of trade (i.e., the ratio of the price of its export good to its import 
good on world markets). They consider the possibility that the harmed country may hold 
an auction for retaliation of this size.114  Their model equates this magnitude of retaliation 
with welfare.  
In 2000, the Meltzer Commission (2000) proposed that "instead of retaliation, 
countries guilty of illegal trade practices should pay an annual fine equal to the value of 
the damages assessed by the panel or provide equivalent trade liberalization."115
Bronckers and van den Broek also propose a fine, as opposed to a welfarist calculation of 
monetary compensation.116  These approaches to monetary fines, while addressing the 
problem of capacity to retaliate and avoiding welfare-reducing trade barriers in 
retaliation, suffer from the same problem as auctions and contingent liberalization 
commitments.  The amounts charged will not be related to the value of the violation.  
112
   Kyle Bagwell, Petros C. Mavroidis, & Robert Staiger, The Case for Auctioning 
Countermeasures in the WTO, Working Paper dated August 2004, available at 
http://www.columbia.edu/~kwb8/auctionation080904.  
113
 WTO Dispute Settlement Body - Special Session - Negotiations on Improvements 
and Clarifications of the Dispute Settlement Understanding—Proposal by Mexico,” 
TN/DS/W/23 (November 4, 2002).
114
   Bagwell et al., supra note 112, note 10, citing Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger,  
An Economic Theory of GATT, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 215 (1999); Kyle Bagwell & Robert 
W. Staiger, Reciprocity, Non-Discrimination and Preferential Agreements in the 
Multilateral Trading System, 17 EUR. J. PO. ECON.  281 (2001); KYLE BAGWELL & 
ROBERT W. STAIGER, THE ECONOMICS OF THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM (2002). 
115
   Meltzer, Allan H. 2000. Report of International Financial Institution Advisory 
Commission.  <http://phantom-x.gsia.cmu.edu/IFIAC/USMRPTDV.html>
116
   Bronckers & van den Broek, supra note 12.
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Of course it is possible that specification of liquidated damages, whether in terms 
of contingent liberalization commitments117 or cash amounts, may have substantial 
advantages under certain circumstances.  However, these advantages would apply mostly 
to relatively discrete contracts with limited subject matters.  It may be difficult for trade 
negotiators to pre-value appropriately all of the different types of breach that might occur.  
Again, the nature of international trade “contracts” entails substantial incompleteness.  
5. Is a Welfare-Based Remedy Possible in Existing WTO Law?
During the pre-1994 GATT period, retaliation was authorized just once,118 and in 
that case the Netherlands determined not to exercise the right to retaliate against the U.S.  
Moreover, until 1995, panel decisions were not adopted without consensus and 
authorization to suspend concessions was not granted without consensus.  This meant that 
the respondent state could block any formal sanctions.  So, there was little reason to 
scrutinize the calculation of authorized retaliation.  Today, it appears desirable to
examine the structure of remedies to determine whether it may be made more efficient.  
a. Retrospective or Prospective Calculation
It seems clear that in order to equate retaliation with a welfare-based calculation 
of damage, it would be necessary to calculate damage on both a retrospective and 
prospective basis.  Thus, first of all, a state that violates WTO law should be required to 
make a payment even if it ceases its violation after a DSB decision,119 or after the expiry 
of the “reasonable period of time” given for compliance.  This is necessary in order to 
make WTO law incentive-compatible, and in order to compensate complainant states for 
their losses.  In fact, unless it were shown that the present trade volume-based approach 
systematically overstated retaliation, or some other reason were shown to give offending 
states a “free ride” until adjudication and expiry of time for compliance, this modification 
should be made in the present system.  As stated above, nothing in the text of the DSU 
limits retaliation to calculation based on prospective nullification or impairment.  Indeed, 
it seems patently counter-textual to apply this limit.120
b. Bilateral or Global Injury
117
   Lawrence, supra note 12.
118
   Netherlands - Measures of Suspension of Obligations to the United States, BISD 
1S/32-33. 
119 See Lawrence, supra note 12, at 30, 38.  See also Proposal by Government of 
Mexico, TN/DS/W/40, 27 January 2003 (raising the issue of retrospective measurement).
120
   There may be an argument that Article XVI:1 of the WTO Charter supports 
“continued” calculation on a prospective-only basis.  That provision states that “[e]xcept 
as otherwise provided under this Agreement or the Multilateral Trade Agreements, the 
WTO shall be guided by the decisions, procedures, and customary practices followed” 
under GATT 1947.  The questions would be whether the prospective-only calculation 
qualifies as a “customary practice” and whether Article 22.4 provides otherwise.  
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It seems likely that in order to make WTO law enforcement incentive compatible, 
it would be appealing to require violating states to pay damages in relation to the injury 
caused to all member states, and not just those who join in litigation.  A change in the last 
sentence of Article 22.2 of the DSU would be necessary to achieve this outcome.  If this 
change were made, it might make it more likely that states would negotiate voluntary 
compensation pursuant to Article 22.2.  
c. Calculating Welfare
We show above that while a welfare-based approach might compete with a public 
choice-based approach, there is no assurance that the present system of calculating 
retaliation based on trade volumes is superior to a welfare-based calculation under a
public choice model.  Obviously, Article 22.4 limits authorized retaliation to “suspension 
of concessions or other obligations,” and so cash remedies would only be possible with 
an amendment to this provision.  
Anderson shows that “ensuring equivalence between the damage and the 
retaliation in terms of the gross value of trade between the respondent and the 
complainant does not mean that retaliation has the same economic welfare effect on the 
respondent as the initial damage is having on the complainant.”121 Furthermore, 
retaliation is not costless to the complainant.122  Anderson concludes that 
The economic purist might wonder why the value of imports curtailed, rather than 
a valuation of the national economic welfare consequences of the import barriers, 
is used to determine equivalence in retaliation to nullification or impairment.  The 
reason probably has much less to do with an understanding of economics than 
with the relative simplicity of the traditional concept of trade equivalence.123
Lawrence agrees that “the dollar value of trade may give little guidance as to the 
welfare benefits and opportunity cost associated with any particular transaction.”124
Lawrence points out that as applied, the DSU does not provide complainants with what 
would amount to “expectation damages.”  
Rebalancing trade volumes leads to equivalence only in a mercantilist sense of 
allowing the plaintiff to eliminate the “bad” of imports.  If politicians are 
concerned only about the trade balance, they may feel compensated, but in terms 
of economic welfare, only (external) harm done to the plaintiff country due to the 
decline in its terms of trade can be taken care of by suspension.  If it retaliates, the 
plaintiff country will not be compensated for the (internal) efficiency losses that 
will result from its higher tariffs.  Instead of being in the position it would have 
121
   Anderson, supra note 12, at 127. 
122 Id., at 128.  
123 Id., at 133.
124
   Lawrence, supra note 12, at 52. 
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been had the agreement been implemented, the plaintiff will find itself in the 
position it was before the negotiation that resulted in the agreement.125
[check this] Bernstein and Skully set out the difference between a welfare-based 
calculation of damages and a volume of trade-based calculation.126 They note that both 
calculations rely on counterfactuals:  compare the world with the illegal policy to the 
counterfactual world without the policy.  The welfare-based calculation in connection 
with an illegally raised tariff would proceed as follows.  (Note that other types of 
violation would require different, and often more complex, calculations.)  The tariff 
results in higher domestic prices, causing domestic firms to increase production, and 
causing domestic consumers to reduce consumption.  Import volumes are reduced.  
Current analysis would focus simply on the reduced import volumes.  
A welfare-based calculation, on the other hand, would examine transfers between 
sectors and dead-weight welfare losses.  An illegal tariff reduces welfare of domestic 
consumers, through a transfer from consumers to domestic producers.  The tariff itself 
represents a transfer from consumers to the government of the importing state.  Domestic 
producers benefit from higher prices.  And there is a net welfare loss.  Bernstein and 
Skully show that, except for the net welfare loss, all other effects are transfers between 
domestic agents in the importing state, and from a national welfare perspective, they net 
out.  However, it is important to note that Bernstein and Skully’s model is based on a 
small country, where there are no terms of trade effects.  Furthermore, it may not be clear 
that it is appropriate to net transfers between domestic agents.  From a public choice 
standpoint, benefits to domestic producers play a greater role than detriments to domestic 
consumers.  And so, it might be argued that the government imposing trade barriers 
should not “benefit” in this sense from detriments it imposes on its own consumers.  Or it 
might be argued that trade law should reverse the public choice bias by redistributing 
these benefits from domestic producers to domestic consumers.  This suggests an 
argument that, in order to establish appropriate incentives for domestic governments, 
these governments should implement private rights of action that allow domestic 
consumers to recover amounts transferred to domestic producers.  
Bernstein and Skully posit that “[e]conomists are concerned about efficiency, 
while arbitrators are concerned about dispute resolution and distributional justice.”127
However, WTO arbitrators are mandated simply to examine the equivalent level of 
nullification or impairment.  As suggested above, this language does not exclude a 
welfare-based measure, although there may be an interpretative argument, based on prior 
GATT practice, that the language was intended to refer to trade volumes.  Even this 
interpretative argument raises substantial questions, as many types of WTO law do not 
125 Id. at 37.
126
   Jason Bernstein & David Skully, Calculating Trade Damages in the Context of the 
World Trade Organization’s Dispute Settlement Process, 25 REV. AG. ECON. 385 (2003).  
This paragraph draws substantially on pages 386-387 of Bernstein and Skully’s work.  
127 Id. at 386.
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deal with trade volumes at all.128 Bernstein and Skully are concerned that the amount of 
dead-weight loss will not be sufficient to deter violation, and it is on this basis that they 
explain the turn to trade volume- based remedies.  Their argument is that importing 
governments seek public choice welfare, and respond to incentives that loom larger than 
the requirement to compensate for the dead-weight loss.129 However, this position seems 
unconcerned with the possibility of efficient breach.  
Bernstein and Skully argue for penalties above the level of welfare loss in order to 
deter non-compliance.  They find that lost trade as a measure is simple and 
straightforward and “does a reasonable job of approximating the amount of impairment 
caused by the ban [in the Hormones case].130”  However, they offer no empirical support 
for the proposition that the lost trade measure reasonably approximates impairment.  One 
might respond that, even in public choice terms, a specified volume of trade may have 
widely varying effects on profitability or jobs, and thus on political support.  
Furthermore, as Mitchell, and Kovelock and Thursby, show, broader 
“international obligation” or reputation may induce compliance where formal remedies 
are otherwise insufficient.131 Hudec adds that legal rulings by themselves induce 
compliance by (i) empowering domestic constituencies who prefer the WTO-compliant 
policy, and (ii) bringing to bear longer-term interests in the efficacy of the legal 
system.132 Thus, legal rulings can be expected to have an effect that is separate from, and 
supplemental to, any formal remedy.  Under GATT 1947, retaliation was almost never 
employed, yet compliance with panel decisions was rather good.  The point is not that the 
magnitude of the formal sanctions is irrelevant to compliance, especially under the more 
formal WTO system, but that it is only one factor in determining compliance.
d. A Competition Law Analogy 
Competition law responds to private actions that foreclose markets, and so there is 
at least some basis for considering an analogy between competition law remedies for 
private measures that foreclose markets133 and remedies for violations of WTO law that 
result in market foreclosure.  Obviously, not all WTO law violations result in market 
foreclosure.  There are many additional distinctions, some of which we address below.  
Keith Hylton writes that 
Under the assumption that enforcement is costless and that the government will 
identify and punish all antitrust violators with probability one, the consumer 
128 See, e.g., U.S.—Copyrights, supra note 81.
129 Id. at 387.  
130 Id. at 391.
131 See note 34, supra.  
132
   Hudec, supra note 2, at 82-83.  Schwartz and Sykes follow this closely.  Schwartz 
and Sykes, supra note 32, at 194.  
133 See William B. Tye & Stephen H. Kalos, Antitrust Damages from Lost 
Opportunities, 1996 ANTITRUST BULL. 637 (1996).  
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welfare-maximizing fine is easy to state:  the optimal fine equals the sum of the 
portion of deadweight loss borne by consumers and the monopoly transfer.134
However, there is no consensus that existing competition law remedies, including 
treble damages in the U.S., approximate optimal penalties.  Where enforcement is costly 
and uncertain, the optimal fine (the distinction between a fine and a “liability” need not 
concern us here) adds the cost of enforcement, and multiplies the total by the inverse of 
the probability of enforcement.135  The equation is as follows:
Optimal fine = 1/p (transfer plus consumer deadweight loss) + C
Where p is the probability of enforcement and C is the cost of enforcement.  
e. Problems of Calculation
Of course, any welfare-based calculation will be difficult, and subject to many 
uncertainties.  Lawrence states that [i]n principle, assuming the product is produced 
competitively, this calculation requires a complex econometric model that embodies 
estimates of supply and demand elasticities to provide the answer.”136 Hylton suggests 
that “[m]any large antitrust cases now involve experts trained in econometrics who could 
provide reliable estimates of the transfer and foregone consumer surplus components.”137
These components would be analogous to those arising from violations of WTO law that 
result in market foreclosure.  
Basically, the calculation would value the stream of income in a hypothetical 
world without the violation, and subtract the actual stream of income:  a “but for” 
calculation.  In the competition law context, the following principles would be applied to 
estimate damages:138
i. Future damages may be measured as the net present value of 
expected cash flows in the “but for” world that would have existed 
but for the violation, minus the net present value of expected cash 
flows in the “actual” world after the violation.  The net present 
value of expected cash flows will be equal to the present value of 
the cash flows generated by an investment minus the amount of the 
investment.
ii. Future expected cash flows should be discounted at the appropriate 
risk- adjusted opportunity cost of capital.
134 KEITH N. HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAW:  ECONOMIC THEORY & COMMON LAW 
EVOLUTION 44 (2003) (emphasis in original). 
135 Id. at 46.  See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. 
POL. ECON. 169 (1968).
136
   Lawrence, supra note 12, at 85.
137
   Hylton, supra note 134. at 47.  
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   Adapted from Tye & Kalos, supra note 133, at 643.
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iii. Opportunity costs (possible mitigation) must be accounted for.
iv. Risks of future uncertainty should be accounted for by examining 
the full range of alternative scenarios.
v. Large damage estimates usually arise from either market. 
imperfections or economic rents or the presence of sunk costs.
f. Probability of Enforcement
How is the probability of enforcement to be calculated?  In order to provide 
appropriate incentives to each person, it might be suggested that the probability of 
enforcement should be calculated separately for each type of case and for each person.139
Thus, it is more likely that enforcement would be effected against the U.S. in a case of 
tariffs that exceed its bindings with no defense, than against Mozambique in a case of de 
facto discrimination where there is a plausible health-based defense.  Under these 
circumstances, it might be argued, the probability multiplier should be higher for 
Mozambique than for the U.S. for two reasons.  First, because Mozambique is less likely 
to attract enforcement attention.  Second, because due to the uncertainty of victory, 
litigation is less likely.  Yet this seems like a perverse approach that would result in 
greater remedies against states with the least power to consume, as well as greater 
remedies in cases where WTO law is most uncertain.  
On the other hand, as developing countries are less likely to bring cases, it may be 
appropriate to use a higher multiplier in cases brought by developing countries in order to 
reflect those cases that are not brought, or the developing countries that fail to join in 
relevant cases.  
An alternative approach is to utilize average probabilities of enforcement.  This 
would result in states with higher probabilities of enforcement being subjected to higher 
multipliers than if their individual probabilities were considered.  However, it is likely 
that the states subject to higher probabilities of enforcement would be larger economies 
than those subject to lower probabilities.140  Therefore, the use of average probabilities 
may not be politically attractive. 
g. Collective Sanctions and Class Actions
Developing countries, and especially those with smaller economies, have two 
problems.  First, WTO remedies do not seem to be designed to be useful to them.  
Second, even if WTO remedies were redesigned as suggested in this article to be more 
useful to developing countries, there are still significant barriers to their utility.  These 
barriers include the cost of litigation.  Costs of litigation can be reduced by arrangements 
by which smaller economies arrange to work together, sharing costs.  
139 See Richard Craswell,  Deterrence and Damages: The Multiplier Principle and Its
Alternatives, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2185, 2191-93 (1999).  
140
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More importantly, however, in order for remedies to have a full incentive effect 
on the behavior of potential violators of WTO law, it is necessary that all injured states 
receive the relevant compensation.141  If the likelihood is that only a subset of these states 
will be compensated, potential violators will not be deterred.  
h. Police Patrols and Fire Alarms, Public Attorneys General, Public “Private” 
Attorneys General, and Private Private Attorneys General
[to be provided]
6. Cash Remedies and Enforcement 
Financial compensation has been proposed by several governments in connection 
with Doha round negotiations.142 Once we calculate damages in welfare terms, it is an 
easy and all but inevitable step to move to payment of financial compensation.  As 
Bronckers and Broek have pointed out, financial compensation “is not a novel idea:  
reparation by governments of injury for which they can be held responsible is part of the 
tradition of public international law.”143 Indeed, financial compensation seems to be the 
preferred remedy in general international law.  It has been most widely used in arbitral 
awards in connection with the impairment of investments.   
The greatest problems with cash remedies relate to enforcement.  Whereas trade 
retaliation entails “self-help,” payment of cash requires action by the respondent.  
However, we have some experience with requirements of cash payments by states.  As 
noted above, the U.S.-Copyright case was formally settled using cash payments.  The 
Bananas case may have been settled informally between Ecuador and the EC through 
cash consideration.  And we have some experience from outside trade law, as well as 
some new initiatives within the trade context.  
a. Use of Cash Remedies in Investment Agreements
In connection with investment agreements, the presumptive remedy for violation 
of investor rights is calculation of a cash payment.  For example, Article 1135 of NAFTA 
provides for final awards in investor-state arbitration requiring only either the payment of 
monetary damages or restitution.  In cases where restitution is ordered, the award is 
required to provide that the state involved may pay monetary damages in lieu of 
restitution.  So, we have some experience with state obligations to pay monetary 
damages.  Monetary damages may be subject to dispute, and states may be recalcitrant in 
141 See Kenneth Abbott, GATT as a Public Institution:  The Uruguay Round and 
Beyond, 18 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 31, 65 (1992).  
142 See, e.g., Preparations for the 1999 Ministerial Conference—The Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU), Communication from Pakistan to the General Council, 
WT/GC/W/162 (April 1, 1999); Least Developed Countries' Proposal, TN/DS/W/17, 
October 9, 2002, point 13; Proposal of Ecuador, TN/DS/W/33, January 23, 2003, at 4.
143
  Bronckers & Broek, supra note 12, at 109.  
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paying, but this has not deterred the implementation of monetary remedies in the 
investment context.144 Of course, investment agreements generally provide for awards 
that specify payment from states to private parties, but there is no reason to believe that 
complainant states would have a greater problem collecting than private parties.  As 
investment agreements address public policy issues with greater frequency, and as trade 
agreements are increasingly understood as affecting private persons, we may observe 
increasing convergence.  
b. Use of Cash Remedies in Trade Agreements
Under the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation,145 states 
may complain about persistent failures by other member states to enforce their 
environmental laws.  These complaints may be submitted to arbitration and the panel may 
impose a “monetary enforcement assessment.”  While this facility has not been used to 
reach this stage, where a party fails to pay a monetary enforcement assessment, the 
complaining party may suspend the application of NAFTA benefits in an amount 
sufficient to collect the monetary enforcement assessment.146 Thus, trade-based sanctions 
may be used to enforce monetary sanctions.  Such a structure could be considered in a 
restructured WTO system of remedies.  Similar provisions are provided in the North 
American Agreement on Labor Cooperation.  Other U.S. FTAs, notably that with 
Chile,147 incorporate similar facilities.  
In addition, the U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement also permits monetary 
assessments to be substituted for retaliation in normal trade barrier cases, pursuant to 
Article 22.15.  If the parties are unable to agree on an amount, the amount of monetary 
assessment is set at 50% of the level of nullification or impairment determined by the 
panel.  Article 20.5 of the U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement and Article 21.11 of the 
U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement make similar provision.  The fact that these 
provisions calculate cash payments as a percentage of the trade effects (presumably 
intended by “nullification or impairment”) suggests how difficult negotiators may find it 
to develop a welfare-based formula.   All these provisions have a retaliatory “back-up” if 
states decline to pay monetary compensation.  
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c. Public Choice Problems with Cash Remedies
Nzelibe argues that the problem with a move away from the current system to 
cash remedies is that cash remedies would be paid by the violating state from general 
funds, and therefore would not provide incentives for compliance.148  This is a public 
choice-based analytical insight that assumes that the state’s actions are a kind of 
aggregate of interest group pressures, and further assumes that dispersed interest groups, 
like taxpayers, are unable to affect policy.  However, these assumptions may not 
accurately portray the qualities of representative government in particular cases.  Nzelibe 
also sees converse benefits in a rule of specific performance backed up by market-closing 
retaliation that can be used to enlist domestic export interests in the violating state to 
lobby for compliance.149
Nzelibe’s argument relates to the allocation of penalties within the violating state, 
rather than to the quantification of penalties.  However, it is not impossible that cash 
remedies could be imposed directly on the industry within the violating state that is 
benefited by the violation.  This would have the triple advantages of (i) accurate 
quantification, (ii) avoidance of a second market distortion, and (iii) fairness, as it would 
not impose the punishment randomly on violating state export interests.  
So, recognizing the value of Nzelibe’s insights, they do not necessarily argue 
against cash remedies.  Rather, they argue in favor of a particular distribution of cash 
remedies to remove the incentives of import competing industries to seek protection.  A 
decision to impose the cash remedies on the domestic beneficiary industry would be even 
better targeted in public choice terms than trade-blocking retaliation against an innocent 
bystander export industry in the same state.  Interestingly, in the domestic antitrust 
context, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine would immunize industries that lobby 
government for action that violates antitrust laws.
[this is an argument for PRAs for domestic consumers paying too high a price, and for 
foreign producers to recover the transfer; in competition law, do we let the claimant 
producer recover the lost consumer surplus?]
7. Conclusion
As suggested above, it appears that an efficient approach to remedies at the WTO 
would distinguish among different types of rules.  For rules that are amenable to a 
“damages” remedy, the following calculation would appear to be an appropriate starting 
point for discussion.  
p
1 cmt + e = md
where 
148
  Nzelibe, supra note __, at __.  
149 Id.
43
cmt = the value of multilateral injury caused by the violation, calculated as the 
amount of the transfer plus consumer deadweight loss, ex tunc (including both 
retrospective and prospective components), plus interest from the date of injury
p = the probability of enforcement
e = cost of enforcement
md = measure of damages
As suggested above, the role of reputation is somewhat problematic, as it might 
induce inefficient compliance under full formal penalties.  From a political standpoint, a 
damages multiplier to reflect the probability of enforcement may also be problematic, and 
may be unnecessary under full formal penalties.  Full formal penalties might provide 
sufficient incentives for litigation to make the probability of enforcement relatively high.  
This paper has been intended to suggest the legal and policy options available in 
order to reform the structure of remedies in WTO dispute settlement.  While developed 
states may not be willing to give up the privileged position they now hold by virtue of the 
existing structure of remedies, negotiations may be advanced by demonstrating the extent 
and irrationality of the privilege.  
*   *   *
